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Abstract 
We present a heterogeneous-firm model in which management ability increases both production efficiency and 
product quality. Combining six micro-datasets on management practices, production and trade in Chinese and 
American firms, we find broad support for the model's predictions. First, better managed firms are more likely to 
export, sell more products to more destination countries, and earn higher export revenues and profits. Second, 
better managed exporters have higher prices, higher quality, and lower quality-adjusted prices. Finally, they also 
use a wider range of inputs, higher quality and more expensive inputs, and imported inputs from more advanced 
countries. The structural estimates indicate that management is important for improving production efficiency and 
product quality in both countries, but it matters more in China than in the US, especially for product quality. 
Panel analysis for the US and a randomized control trial in India suggest that management exerts causal effects on 
product quality, production efficiency, and exports. Poor management practices may thus hinder trade and 
growth, especially in developing countries. 
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1 Introduction
Productivity, management practices and international trade activity vary dramatically across
firms and countries (Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott, 2007; Syverson, 2011). In the litera-
ture, higher measured Total Factor Productivity (TFP) has been associated with export success
and superior management with higher profits. However, measured TFP is subject to estimation
biases and constitutes a residual “black box”, while the mechanisms through which manage-
ment operates remain largely unknown. From a policy perspective, improving firm capabilities is
important for stimulating firm performance and aggregate growth, but this requires knowledge
of the determinants of firm productivity. While it is widely believed that management strate-
gies play a central role, especially in emerging economies trying to move up the quality ladder
(Sutton, 2012), the scant evidence for this is primarily from case studies.
In this paper we perform what we believe is the first large-scale analysis of the role of man-
agement practices for export performance and in the process shed light on these questions. We
uncover novel empirical facts and interpret them through the lens of a heterogeneous-firm theo-
retical model that disciplines the estimation approach. We study the world’s two largest export
economies - China and the United States - and find consistent empirical patterns in both coun-
tries despite their very di↵erent income levels, institutional quality and market frictions. In
particular, we exploit unique new data on plant-level production, plant-level management prac-
tices, and transaction-level international trade activity for 485 Chinese firms in 1999-2008 and
over 10,000 US firms in 2010.
We first establish that better managed firms have superior export performance. Companies
with more e↵ective management practices are systematically more likely to engage in exporting.
Conditional on exporting, they sell more products to more destination countries and earn higher
export revenues and profits. In addition, our findings for management survive when we explicitly
control for revenue-based firm TFP as commonly constructed in the literature.
We then present a collection of independent results that jointly inform the mechanisms
through which management strategies a↵ect firm performance. On the sales side, better man-
aged firms charge higher export prices within narrowly defined destination-product markets. We
estimate a model-consistent indicator of product quality, and show that management competence
is associated with higher output quality and lower quality-adjusted prices. On the production
side, better managed companies use more expensive, higher-quality imported inputs and more
inputs from suppliers located in developed economies. They also source a wider range of distinct
inputs from more countries of origin.
We propose that these empirical patterns are consistent with management competence being
an important component of firms’ total factor productivity, whereby more e↵ective managerial
practices increase both production e ciency and quality capacity. Superior management enables
firms to use more sophisticated, higher-quality inputs and more complex assembly technologies
that increase output quality. At the same time, advanced management allows firms to process
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inputs and execute assembly more cheaply. When both the e ciency and quality channels are
active, they push marginal costs in opposite directions, such that the net e↵ect of management
competence on prices and quantities is ambiguous, but it unambiguously raises product qual-
ity, sales and profits. These predictions are preserved when we extend the baseline model to
incorporate endogenous input choice, endogenous management practices, or non-management
components of TFP.
Our main empirical analysis explores the cross-sectional variation in management and trade
activity across Chinese and American firms. We therefore do not distinguish between a causal
e↵ect of good management and an equilibrium relationship between joint outcomes of the firm’s
profit maximization problem. Instead, we view our baseline results as conditional correlations
that inform the mechanisms through which management operates. We also provide two additional
pieces of evidence that suggest a causal role for management competence. These are based on
panel analysis of changes within US firms over time and on a randomized control trial that o↵ered
management consulting to Indian firms. Both exercises reveal patterns closely in line with the
cross-section.
Our findings address two open questions in two separate, active literatures. A large theoretical
and empirical literature in international trade emphasizes the role of firm productivity as a key
determinant of firms’ export performance (Melitz, 2003; Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum,
2003; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott, 2007). More productive
firms have been found to export more products to more destinations, thereby generating higher
export revenues and profits. This body of work conceptualizes firm productivity as TFPQ, or the
ability to manufacture at low marginal costs, such that more productive firms are more successful
exporters because they set lower prices. Recent analyses point to the importance of product
quality as well, showing that more successful exporters use higher-quality manufactured inputs
and more skilled workers in order to produce higher-quality output that sells at higher prices
(Verhoogen, 2008; Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012; Khandelwal, 2010; Manova and Zhang, 2012;
Johnson, 2012; Bastos, Silva, and Verhoogen, 2018). Yet productivity is typically measured as
TFPR, or a revenue-based residual from production function estimates. This makes it subject to
estimation bias and complicates the interpretation of trade-TFPR regression analyses (Ackerberg,
Caves, and Frazer, 2015; De Loecker, 2011). Thus, an important open question in the trade
literature is what constitutes productivity, how it should be measured, and what explains its
vast variation across firms.
A separate and older literature has examined the relationship between firm management,
productivity and performance (Walker, 1887; Taylor, 1911; Syverson, 2011). One likely route
for this management-productivity link emphasized by the management literature is through lean
manufacturing and improved quality (Deming, 1950; Womack, Jones, and Roos, 1990; Drew,
McCallum, and Roggenhofer, 2016; Sutton, 2007). Yet there is no systematic, direct evidence
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on the mechanisms through which management operates.1
Our work informs both of these open questions. We conclude that e↵ective management en-
hances firm performance by enabling firms to manufacture higher-quality goods more e ciently,
such that both production e ciency and quality capability increase with management compe-
tence. We also unpack the black box of TFPR and identify management practices as a concrete,
tangible and directly measured TFPQ component that accounts for the heterogeneity in firm
performance. Studying management practices thus circumvents concerns with estimation biases
in trade-productivity regressions and delivers clearer policy lessons.
This paper also adds to recent research on the impact of trade liberalization on the organiza-
tion of production inside firms. Evidence indicates that trade reforms incentivize firms to change
the number of management layers, adjust the number and wages of managers and workers along
the occupational hierarchy, and upgrade management practices (Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg,
2012; Caliendo, Monte, and Rossi-Hansberg, 2017; Chakraborty and Raveh, 2018; Chen and
Steinwender, 2016). At the same time, improved access to imported inputs is important to the
product quality, product scope and export success of firms in developing countries, because of
the limited domestic supply of high-quality specialized inputs and equipment (Goldberg, Khan-
delwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova, 2010; Fieler, Eslava, and Xu, 2018; Manova and Zhang, 2012).
This matters since poor economies often rely on international trade for growth, and specifically
on exporting to large, developed and profitable markets that maintain high quality standards. In
light of these two lines of work, our results suggest that poor managerial practices may impede
trade, growth and entrepreneurship in the world’s poorest economies.
Finally, our findings speak to the active literature on the implications of firm heterogeneity
for aggregate productivity, welfare and the gains from trade (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Arko-
lakis, Costinot, and Rodr´ıguez-Clare, 2012; Melitz and Redding, 2013). Evidence indicates that
reallocations across firms and across products within firms, as well as productivity upgrading
within firms contribute significantly to the aggregate adjustment to trade reforms and macroeco-
nomic shocks (Pavcnik, 2002; Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum, 2003; Bustos, 2011; Berthou,
Chung, Manova, and Bragard, 2016). Understanding the sources of firm heterogeneity is thus
important for understanding aggregate outcomes. In addition, given evidence on the complemen-
tarity between manufactured input quality and skilled labor in the production of output quality
(Verhoogen, 2008), quality di↵erentiation across firms and its interplay with management com-
petence also has implications for the di↵erential e↵ects of shocks across the firm size and worker
skill distributions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 theoretically models the role
of management competence for firms’ export performance. Section 3 introduces the Chinese and
1The most popular management systems - Six-Sigma, Lean, and the Toyota Production System - all emphasize
that improving productivity and quality is best achieved by an ongoing focus on reducing defects. In fact, this
approach is now so popular that it has spread from manufacturing across most sectors, for example to Lean Retail
(Myerson, 2014), Lean Healthcare (Group, 2014) and even Lean Government (Teeuwen, 2010).
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US data on firms’ balance sheets, trade activity, and management practices. Section 4 examines
the relationship between firms’ management competence and export performance, and explores
how managerial strategies contribute to firm productivity. Section 5 analyzes the e ciency and
quality mechanisms through which superior management operates. Section 6 provides evidence
from both a randomized control trial and within-firm changes in the panel that is consistent with
causal e↵ects of good management. The last section concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
We develop a theoretical model of international trade in which heterogeneous firms choose how
many products to manufacture, what markets to enter, and which products to sell in each
market. In the baseline set-up, firms receive an exogenous draw of management competence
which uniquely determines firm choices and performance outcomes. We consider the endogenous
adoption of management practices in an extension to this benchmark model in Appendix 2.1.
We posit that e↵ective management can enhance firm performance by increasing production
e ciency and/or quality capacity. We characterize the relationship between firms’ management
competence and trade activity under alternative assumptions about the relative importance of
these two channels, and derive testable predictions that allow us to empirically assess their
relevance in practice. We relegate all detailed proofs to Appendix 1.
We incorporate management competence in a partial-equilibrium trade model that features
quality and e ciency di↵erentiation across firms and across products within multi-product firms.
In our baseline, we treat management e↵ectiveness as equivalent to TFP, such that our model
closely resembles that in Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2010)(BRS), Kugler and Verhoogen
(2012), and Manova and Yu (2017). We examine the alternative in which management practices
are one of multiple components of firm productivity in Appendix 2.2.
2.1 Set Up
Consider a world with J + 1 countries. In each country, a continuum of heterogeneous firms
produce horizontally and vertically di↵erentiated goods which they sell at home and potentially
export abroad. Consumers exhibit love of variety such that the representative consumer in
country j has CES utility Uj =
hR
i2⌦j (qjixji)
↵ di
i 1
↵
, where qji and xji are the quality and
quantity consumed by country j of variety i, and ⌦j is the set of goods available to j. The
elasticity of substitution across products is   ⌘ 1/(1   ↵) > 1 with 0 < ↵ < 1. If total
expenditure in country j is Rj , j’s demand for variety i is xji = RjP
  1
j q
  1
ji p
  
ji , where Pj =R
i2⌦j
⇣
pji
qji
⌘1  
di
  1
1  
is a quality-adjusted ideal price index and pji is the price of variety i
in country j. Quality is thus defined as any objective attribute, subjective taste preference or
other demand shock that increases the consumer appeal of a product given its price. Note that a
su cient statistic for unobserved product quality ln qji within market j can be constructed from
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observed price and quantity data as   ln pji+lnxji, since Rj and Pj do not vary across products
sold in j (Khandelwal, 2010; Khandelwal, Schott, and Wei, 2013).
2.2 Production and Sales Technology
The production technology is characterized by a production function for physical units of output
and a production function for output quality. Firms’ management competence can a↵ect both
the ability to assemble given inputs at low cost and the capacity to make high-quality goods.
We refer to these two mechanisms as production e ciency and quality capacity.
In order to begin manufacturing, entrepreneurs have to incur sunk entry costs associated with
research and product development. They face uncertainty about their production e ciency and
product quality, and observe them only after completing this irreversible investment. At that
point they decide whether to exit immediately or commence production and possibly export.
Upon entry, firms draw firm-wide managerial ability ' 2 (0,1) from distribution g(') and a
vector of firm-product specific expertise levels  i 2 (0,1) from distribution z( ). We will think
of better managed firms as having a higher ability draw '.2,3 Since the success of research and
product development may di↵er across products within a firm, we assume that g(') and z( )
are independent of each other and common across firms with continuous cumulative distribution
functions G(') and Z( ) respectively, while   is i.i.d. across products and firms.
Producing one unit of physical output requires (' i)
   units of labor whose wage is nor-
malized to 1 to serve as the numeraire. The parameter   > 0 governs the extent to which
good management practices can lower unit input requirements and increase the e ciency with
which these inputs are assembled into final goods. Intuitively, e↵ective management can improve
production e ciency by optimizing inventory control, synchronizing and monitoring production
targets across manufacturing stages, reducing wastage, incentivizing workers, etc.
At a marginal cost of (' i)
✓   workers, the firm produces one unit of product i with quality
qi (', i) = (' i)
✓, ✓ > 0. This reduced-form quality production function captures the idea that
manufacturing goods of higher quality is associated with higher marginal costs because it requires
the use of more complex assembly processes and more expensive intermediate inputs of higher
quality. For example, while sewing a dress using unskilled labor, cotton and plastic buttons might
entail the same assembly process as sewing a dress using skilled labor, silk and mother-of-pearl
buttons, the latter utilizes more expensive inputs and is considered higher quality. Similarly,
2As we show in Appendix 2.1, one can endogenize management practices while retaining the key features of
the model. For example, entrepreneurs might receive an exogenous talent draw  , choose management practice
m ( ), and face marginal costs and quality that depend on ' =  m ( ) i. If the cost fm of adopting m satisfies
dfm/dm > 0 and d
2fm/dm
2 > 0, then Propositions 1-4 hold both for e↵ective firm ability ' and for management
m ( ).
3We show in Appendix 2.2 that our theoretical predictions would continue to hold if management is one of
multiple draws that jointly determine firm ability. For example, firm ability ' = m ·   may depend on the
entrepreneur’s intrinsic talent   and the manager’s competence for implementing e↵ective management prac-
tices m. If entrepreneurs and managers do not match perfectly assortatively due to labor market frictions, then
|corr(m, )| 6= 1. While all firm outcomes would now be pinned down by ' instead of m alone, management
competence would have the same e↵ects as in our baseline model ceteris paribus.
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while a printer built from 50 components might only be able to print, the sophisticated assembly
of 150 parts might produce a multi-functional printer that can print, scan and photocopy. The
parameter ✓ reflects the degree to which superior management enables firms to produce higher-
quality products. Intuitively, e↵ective management can enhance quality capacity by tightening
quality control, facilitating specialized assembly, minimizing costly mistakes, etc.
For expositional simplicity, we do not explicitly model firms’ input choice in our baseline
set-up, but follow Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) in assuming that product quality is fixed by
exogenous draws. In Appendix 2.3, we formally establish that endogenizing input quality in a
richer framework would preserve our theoretical predictions. Following Kugler and Verhoogen
(2012), we show how complementarity between firm ability and input quality in the production
function for output quality would induce more capable firms to use higher-quality inputs in order
to produce higher-quality goods.
Firms’ marginal cost thus reflects two opposing forces: On the one hand, better managed
firms have higher production e ciency. On the other hand, better managed firms produce higher
quality using more expensive inputs and/or more complex assembly. The net e↵ect of these two
forces on marginal costs is theoretically ambiguous and depends on the relative magnitudes of ✓
and  .
We make a number of standard assumptions about firms’ production and sales costs that
are motivated by salient patterns in the data. Firms incur a fixed operation cost of headquarter
services fh and a fixed overhead cost fp for each active product line, in units of labor. This will
imply that companies with di↵erent ability draws will choose to produce a di↵erent number of
products. Entering each foreign market j is associated with additional headquarter services fhj
necessary for complying with customs and other regulations, as well as for the maintenance of
distribution networks. As a result, some low-ability sellers in the domestic market will not become
exporters or will supply some but not all countries. Finally, exporting entails destination-product
specific fixed costs fpj (constant across products within j, but varying across countries), which
reflect market research, product customization and standardization, and advertising. There are
also variable transportation costs such that ⌧ j units of a good need to be shipped for 1 unit to
arrive. These trade costs will ensure that firms might not o↵er every product they sell at home
in every foreign market they enter.
2.3 Profit Maximization
Firms must decide which products to produce, where to sell them and at what prices in order to
maximize profits from their global operations. With monopolistic competition and a continuum of
varieties, individual producers take all aggregate expenditures Rj and price indices Pj as given,
and separately maximize profits in each country-product market.4 A firm with management
competence ' will choose the sales price and quantity of a product with expertise draw  i in
4See Eckel, Iacovone, Javorcik, and Neary (2015) and Eckel and Neary (2010) for an alternative model which
incorporates product cannibalization e↵ects.
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country j by solving
max
pji,xji
⇡ji (', i) = pji (', i)xji (', i)  ⌧ jxji (', i) (' i)✓     fpj (1)
s.t. xji (', i) = RjP
  1
j qji (', i)
  1 pji (', i)   .
Producers therefore charge a constant mark-up 1↵ over marginal cost, and have the following
price, quantity, quality, quality-adjusted price, revenues and profits for product i in market j:
pji (', i) =
⌧ j (' i)
✓  
↵
, xji (', i) = RjP
  1
j
✓
↵
⌧ j
◆ 
(' i)
   ✓ , (2)
qi (', i) = (' i)
✓ , pji (', i) /qi (', i) =
⌧ j (' i)
  
↵
, (3)
rji (', i) = Rj
✓
Pj↵
⌧ j
◆  1
(' i)
 (  1) , ⇡ji (', i) =
rji (', i)
 
  fpj . (4)
When j corresponds to the firm’s home market, there are no iceberg costs (⌧ j = 1) and the
destination-product fixed cost fpj is replaced by the product-specific overhead cost fp. Note that
the empirical analysis examines free-on-board export prices and revenues, that is pfobji (', i) =
(' i)
✓  
↵ and r
fob
ji (', i) = Rj (Pj↵)
  1 (' i) (  1).
If ✓ = 0 and   > 0, e↵ective management improves firm performance only by increasing
production e ciency but the quality channel is moot. The model then reduces to the BRS
framework in which all firms o↵er the same product quality level, but better managed firms
have lower marginal costs and therefore set lower prices, sell higher quantities, and earn higher
revenues and profits. While formally   = 1 in BRS, this normalization is immaterial when ✓ = 0.
Conversely, if ✓ > 0 and   = 0, management competence benefits firm performance by
improving product quality but the production e ciency mechanism is not active. Now all firms
share the same quality-adjusted prices, revenues and profits, but better managed companies
charge higher prices, o↵er higher quality and sell lower quantities.
The most interesting scenario arises when ✓ > 0 and   > 0, such that management oper-
ates through both the production e ciency and the product quality channels. We focus on this
scenario below as it is most relevant empirically. In this case, superior management is unam-
biguously associated with higher product quality, lower quality-adjusted prices, higher revenues
and higher profits. However, the implications for quantity and price levels are theoretically am-
biguous. If ✓ >  , as management competence grows, product quality rises su ciently quickly
with the cost of sophisticated inputs and assembly to overturn the e↵ects of improved production
e ciency. As a result, e↵ective management corresponds to higher output prices. If ✓ <   by
contrast, good management practices translate into lower prices. In the knife-edge case of ✓ =  ,
production e ciency and product quality are equally elastic in management capacity, and prices
are invariant across the firm management distribution. Finally, better managed firms sell higher
quantities if and only if    > ✓.
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2.4 Selection into Products and Markets
Consumers’ love of variety and the presence of product-specific overhead costs fp imply that no
firm will export a product without also selling it at home. In turn, firms optimally manufacture
only goods for which they can earn non-negative profits domestically. Since profits increase with
product expertise  i, there is a zero-profit expertise level  
⇤ (') for each management ability
draw ' below which firm ' will not make i. This value is defined by:
⇡d (', 
⇤ (')) = 0, rd (', ⇤ (')) =  fp, (5)
where d indicates that revenues are calculated for the domestic market.
Recall that product expertise is independently and identically distributed across goods. By
the law of large numbers, the measure of varieties that a firm with ability ' produces equals
the probability of an expertise draw above  ⇤ ('), or [1  Z ( ⇤ ('))]. Since d ⇤ (') /d' < 0,
better managed firms have a lower zero-profit expertise cut-o↵ and o↵er more products. One
interpretation of this result is that better managed firms bring superior quality control to any
product line. This can partially o↵set using less skilled workers or inputs of lower quality such
that output quality and consumer appeal remain high.
Following the same logic, a firm with ability ' will export product i to country j only if its
expertise draw is no lower than  ⇤j (') given by:
⇡ji
 
', ⇤j (')
 
= 0, rj
 
', ⇤j (')
 
=  fpj . (6)
The measure of products that firm ' sells to j is thus
⇥
1  Z   ⇤j (') ⇤. Since d ⇤j (') /d' < 0,
better managed firms export more products than worse run firms to any given destination.
When the exporting expertise cut-o↵ lies above the zero-profit expertise cut-o↵,  ⇤j (') >
 ⇤ ('), there will be selection into exporting. Across products within a firm, not all goods sold
at home will be shipped to j. Similarly, across firms supplying a product domestically, not all
will be able to market it abroad. Given the overwhelming evidence for both patterns in the prior
literature, we assume that  ⇤j (') >  ⇤ (') holds for all j.
For every management level ', the expertise cut-o↵ for exporting generally varies across
destinations because the market size Rj , price index Pj , variable ⌧ j and fixed fpj trade costs
are country specific. Firms therefore adjust their product range across markets. Each exporter
follows a product hierarchy and adds goods in decreasing order of expertise until it reaches the
marginal product that brings zero profits. Within a supplier, higher-quality goods are shipped to
more countries, earn higher revenues in any given market, and generate higher worldwide sales.
Firms enter a market only if total expected revenues there exceed all associated costs. The
export profits in country j of a firm with management competence ' are:
⇡j (') =
Z 1
 ⇤j (')
⇡j (', ) z ( ) d   fhj . (7)
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Export profits ⇡j (') increase with management ability because better managed firms sell
more products in j (i.e. lower  ⇤j (')) and earn higher revenues from each good (i.e. higher
⇡j (', )) than firms with the same product expertise draws but worse management. Therefore
only firms with management level above a cut-o↵ '⇤j will service destination j, where '⇤j satisfies:
⇡j
 
'⇤j
 
= 0. (8)
With asymmetric countries, '⇤j varies across destinations and better managed firms enter
more markets because they are above the export ability cut-o↵ for more countries. Better
managed exporters thus outperform worse run producers along all three margins: number of
export destinations, product scope in each destination, and sales in each destination-product
market.
Finally, not all firms that incur the sunk cost of entry survive. Once they observe their
management ability and expertise draws, firms begin production only if their expected profits
from all domestic and foreign operations are non-negative. Firm '’s global profits are given by:
⇡ (') =
Z 1
 ⇤(')
⇡d (', ) z ( ) d +
X
j
 Z 1
 ⇤j (')
⇡j (', ) z ( ) d   fhj
!
  fh. (9)
The first integral in this expression captures the firm’s domestic profits from all products above
its expertise cut-o↵ for production  ⇤ ('), while the summation represents worldwide export
profits from all traded products and destinations.
Total profits increase in ' because better managed firms sell more products domestically, earn
higher domestic revenues for each product, and have superior export performance as described
above. Companies below a minimum management level '⇤ are thus unable to break even and exit
immediately upon learning their attributes. This cut-o↵ is defined by the zero-profit condition:
⇡ ('⇤) = 0. (10)
2.5 Empirical Predictions
We summarize the key empirical predictions of the model with the following propositions. We
take these predictions to the data, which we turn to next.
Proposition 1 Better managed firms are more likely to export.
Proposition 2 Better managed firms export more products to more destination markets and
earn higher export revenues and profits.
Proposition 3 Better managed firms o↵er higher-quality products if ✓ > 0, but quality is in-
variant across firms if ✓ = 0. Better managed firms set lower quality-adjusted prices if   > 0, but
quality-adjusted prices are invariant across firms if   = 0. Better managed firms charge higher
prices if ✓ >   and lower prices if   > ✓, but prices are invariant across firms if ✓ =  .
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Proposition 4 Better managed firms use more expensive inputs of higher quality and/or more
expensive assembly of higher complexity if ✓ > 0, but input quality and assembly complexity are
invariant across firms if ✓ = 0.
3 Data
Our analysis makes use of unique, matched establishment- or firm-level data for the world’s two
largest exporters - China and the US - on production (ASIE and ASM), international trade
(CCTS and LFTTD), and management practices (WMS and MOPS) respectively. We exploit
six proprietary micro-data sources in total, three for each country, to assemble a dataset that is
unprecedented in its coverage and detail. This section describes how management practices are
evaluated, introduces the data, and summarizes key features of firm activity.
3.1 Measuring Management Practices
Systematic data on firms’ management practices have only recently become available. Since
the first major wave in 2004, the World Management Survey (WMS) has developed standardized
measures of management competence for over 20,000 manufacturing firms located in 34 countries.
It considers multiple aspects of firm management, and evaluates the relative e↵ectiveness of
di↵erent practices within each aspect. WMS is conducted via double-blind phone interviews
with plant managers, and covers representative firm samples in a large number of countries.5
The Management and Organizational Practices Survey (MOPS), which was introduced by the
US Census in 2010, is modeled after WMS and provides management scores for around 32,000
US manufacturing establishments.
WMS (MOPS) includes 18 (16) questions about the management of physical capital (mon-
itoring and targets) and human resources (incentives) inside a firm, examples of which appear
in Figure 1. A first set of questions pertain to the monitoring of progress towards production
targets via the frequent collection, analysis and dissemination of multiple performance metrics.
A second set of questions characterize the design, integration and realism of production targets.
These questions assess to what extent targets are consistently set across production stages and
tightly connected to performance, both in the short-run and long-run, for managers and non-
managers. A final set of questions capture the use of incentives mechanisms to identify, promote
and reward high performers with bonuses, while sanctioning underperformers.
Each management question is scored on a scale of 1 to 5 in WMS and 0 to 1 in MOPS,
with higher values indicating more structured management involving greater monitoring, more
aggressive targets and stronger performance incentives. For each country, we first standardize
the responses to each question across all firms to be mean 0 and standard deviation 1. We
then average across questions to obtain a single management score for each firm in order to be
5See Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) for full details of the survey process.
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comprehensive. Finally, we standardize these management scores across firms in each country to
be mean 0 and have standard deviation 1.
WMS and MOPS are based on the lean manufacturing and modern human resource manage-
ment practices, as used by leading international firms of management consultants, to focus on
core management practices that should benefit firm performance regardless of the industry or eco-
nomic environment. Our analysis will nevertheless account for the possibility that the relevance
of specific management practices might vary across industries with industry fixed e↵ects. We
also conduct all estimations separately for China and the US. This addresses potential concerns
that the e↵ectiveness of certain management practices might depend on the formal and informal
institutions in a country (e.g. labor market flexibility, cultural norms, respect for managerial
hierarchy). To the extent that the management surveys are biased towards successful produc-
tion practices in the West, measurement error would introduce downward bias and work against
us finding consistent patterns for both China and the US. In practice, evidence indicates that
the introduction of more e↵ective management practices according to WMS criteria significantly
improved firm performance in a randomized control trial in India (see Section 6 below).
3.2 United States
We employ three comprehensive datasets on the activities of US firms. First, US management
is assessed using MOPS, the first and only comprehensive management dataset of its kind.
Introduced as a mandatory part of the US Census’s 2010 Annual Survey of Manufacturing, it
documents the management practices of about 32,000 manufacturing establishments in 2010 and
2005 (as a recall). The sample captures 5.6 million employees, which is more than half of US
manufacturing employment. The distribution of the management score across plants is plotted in
Figure 2A. MOPS also includes several variables that we use to control for potential noise in the
management score, namely an indicator for filing census forms online, the tenure and seniority
of the respondent, and the discrepancy between employment data reported in MOPS and ASM.
Second, we obtain standard balance-sheet data on these establishments from the US Annual
Survey of Manufacturers (ASM), available from 1973-20126. The ASM records the total output,
value added, profits and production inputs (such as employment, capital expenditures, energy
inputs and materials purchases) for about 45,000 plants that correspond to over 10,000 firms.
We also observe firms’ age, location (out of 50 states), and primary industry of activity in the
US NAICS 6-digit industry classification. We measure the skill intensity of firms’ production
technology with the log average wage and the share of workers with a college degree, and firms’
capital intensity with log net fixed assets per worker. We construct two proxies for firm produc-
tivity, log value added per worker and the revenue-based TFP residual from production function
6The 2010 MOPS was part of the 2009-2013 ASM panel, so all establishments in the MOPS were surveyed
every year over this period. In prior years establishments are surveyed in years ending with a ”2” or ”7” as part of
the Economic Census, and otherwise if they are part of that year’s ASM panel. Since the ASM panel over-samples
larger establishments, it tends to include a large fraction of export activity.
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regressions a` la Levinsohn-Petrin performed separately for each NAICS-6 industry.
Third, we use the US Longitudinal Federal Trade Transaction Database (LFTTD), which
contains detailed information about the universe of US international trade transactions in 1992-
2012, at over 100 million transactions a year. LFTTD reports the value, quantity, unit (e.g.
dozens, kilograms, etc.) and organization (intra-firm vs. arm’s length) of all firm-level exports
(free on board) and all firm-level imports (cost, insurance and freight included) by country and
product for around 7,000 di↵erent products in the 10-digit Harmonized System and around 5,000
product categories at the HS 8-digit level. The raw data enables us to compute transaction-level
unit values to proxy prices. To ensure comparability, whenever we study product-level data,
a product is defined by both its HS code and unit. Given the lumpiness and seasonality of
international trade, we analyze annual trade flows at various levels of aggregation such as the
firm, firm-product, firm-destination, and firm-product-destination.
We link ASM, LFTTD and MOPS using firms’ tax identifier that is common to all three
datasets.7 We perform our baseline analysis for the resultant cross-section of about 32,000 US
establishments in 2010 with contemporaneous production, trade and management data. The
firms in this matched sample are on average bigger and better performing than firms without
management data, but appear representative in that the relationship between standard produc-
tivity, size and performance metrics is the same in both subsamples. We analyze recall MOPS
data for 2005 and panel ASM and LFTTD data in robustness checks.
3.3 China
We exploit three comprehensive datasets on the activities of Chinese firms that closely mirror
those for the US. First, we observe the management practices of 507 Chinese firms collected in
2006-2007 as part of the World Management Survey (WMS). The distribution of the management
score across firms is plotted in Figure 2B. Unlike MOPS, WMS is run as a telephone survey,
relying on endorsements by respected institutions and highly-trained interviewers (e.g. MBAs)
to achieve a response rate of 45% in China. Firms with 100 to 5000 employees are sampled
randomly, and interviews employ double-blind techniques to obtain unbiased responses from
plant managers. WMS also gathers additional firm and interview demographics. Of these, we
use information on firms’ primary industry of a liation (out of 82 SIC 3-digit industries) and
a set of controls for potential survey noise (interviews’ duration, day of week and time of day;
interviewer ID; interviewee gender, reliability and competence as perceived by the interviewer).
Second, we access production data at the firm level for the 1999-2007 period from China’s
Annual Survey of Industrial Enterprises (ASIE). ASIE is collected by the National Bureau of
Statistics and provides standard balance-sheet information for all state-owned firms and all
7For firms with multiple establishments in ASM, we aggregate up to the firm level by summing production
variables across all establishments belonging to the same firm. In the case of MOPS, we take the employment-
weighted average management score across plants within a firm, but our results are robust to using the simple
average instead. We use the age, location and primary industry of activity of the firm headquarters.
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private firms with sales above 5 million Chinese Yuan, for over 200,000 firms a year. In addition
to output, profits, value added and production inputs, we also observe firms’ age, ownership
structure (private domestic, state-owned domestic, foreign-owned), location (out of 31 provinces),
and primary industry of activity in the Chinese SIC 3-digit industry classification.
Third, we utilize comprehensive data on the universe of Chinese firms’ cross-border trans-
actions in 2000-2008 from the Chinese Customs Trade Statistics (CCTS), spanning over 100
million transactions a year. CCTS is collected by the Chinese Customs O ce and reports the
value and quantity of firm exports (free on board) and imports (cost, insurance and freight in-
cluded) in U.S. dollars by product and trade partner for 243 destination/source countries and
about 7,500 products in the 8-digit Harmonized System.8 We calculate unit values as the ratio
of shipment values and quantities, and analyze trade flows at di↵erent levels of aggregation.
While CCTS does not distinguish between arm’s-length and intra-firm transactions, it indicates
the trade regime under which each export and import flow occurs. China recognizes a formal
processing trade regime that permits duty-free imports of inputs for further processing, assembly
and re-exporting on behalf of a foreign buyer. Each trade transaction is thus labeled as ordinary
or processing trade, and firms can and do legally engage in both operation modes.
Of the 507 Chinese firms in WMS, we are able to match 485 to ASIE using the unique firm
identifier that is common to both databases. We obtain the complete ASIE record for these 485
firms during 1999-2007, which produces an unbalanced panel of 3,233 firm-year observations.
Since CCTS maintains an independent system of firm registration codes, it cannot be mapped
directly into ASIE or WMS. We follow standard practice in the literature and match CCTS to
ASIE using an algorithm based on firms’ name, address and phone number. Using ASIE as
a bridge, we match 296 companies from WMS to CCTS. We then match 58 of the remaining
unmatched companies in WMS directly to CCTS firms by postcode and translated Chinese-to-
English company names. We ensure match quality by manually researching company webpages
and reports, etc. With this two-step matching procedure, we locate detailed CCTS trade data for
354 of the 507 WMS companies, for a match rate of 70%. Of these 354 firms, 11% only export,
17% only import, and 72% both export and import according to CCTS. This is consistent with
the fact that about 60% of the matched WMS-ASIE firms report positive exports on their balance
sheets, while more firms may appear in the comprehensive CCTS records.
3.4 Summary Statistics
As a first glance at the data, we summarize the substantial variation in management practices,
production and trade activity across firms in China and the US in Appendix Table 1. Starting
with the US, 45% of the 32,000 US establishments in our 2010 matched sample export. The
8While the US and China both adhere to a standardized international HS 6-digit product classification system,
countries are free to record their trade activity at finer levels of disaggregation that are not readily comparable
across nations. Our baseline analysis exploits the granularity of the US and Chinese customs data at the HS-8
digit level, but our results are robust to using aggregated trade flows at the common HS-6 digit level or the most
disaggregated data for the US at the HS-10 digit level.
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typical exporter sells 19 di↵erent HS-8 digit products to 13 destinations and, conditional on using
imported inputs, imports 20 distinct products from 6 countries, with large dispersion around
these means.9 These numbers are generally similar for the sample of 485 firms in our baseline
2000-2008 panel for China, where 58% of all firms export. On average, Chinese exporters ship 9
HS-8 digit products to 13 markets and, conditional on using foreign inputs, source 33 di↵erent
products from 6 countries of origin.
Figure 3 illustrates the vast dispersion in average management practices across countries in
WMS. The US comes out on top, followed closely by Japan, Germany, Sweden, Canada and the
UK. In the middle of the country distribution, Chinese firms are on average significantly less well
managed than North American and European companies, but better than firms in Latin America,
Africa and other emerging giants such as Brazil and India. These cross-country averages mask
substantial variation in management practices across firms in each economy, as shown in Figure
2 for China and the US.
Sample means in Appendix Table 1 corroborate stylized facts in the prior literature that
exporters are on average significantly larger and more productive than non-exporters. We docu-
ment that exporters are on average also better managed than non-exporters: The unconditional
export management premium equals 15% of a standard deviation in China and 38% of a standard
deviation in the US. In comparison, the export size premia in China and the US stand at 19%
and 186% respectively based on firm output and 36% and 123% based on employment.
4 Management Practices and Export Performance
The empirical analysis proceeds in two steps. We first examine the relationship between firms’
management practices and export performance. This exercise constitutes a direct test of Propo-
sitions 1 and 2. While it informs some of the mechanisms through which management operates,
it remains agnostic about the importance of good management for production e ciency and
product quality. In Section 5, we study these issues by confronting Propositions 3 and 4 with
the data.
We perform the entire analysis separately for China and the US. Given the vast di↵erence in
income, institutional quality and factor market frictions between the two countries, this allows
us to assess whether management plays a fundamental role in firm activities, and if so, whether
its function depends on the specific economic environment.
4.1 Empirical Strategy
To evaluate the empirical validity of Propositions 1 and 2, we investigate the link between
firms’ management competence and export performance with the following estimating equa-
9For the US, we report summary statistics for balance-sheet variables at the establishment level and for trade
activity at the firm level, since this is the level at which such data are collected in ASM and LFTTD respectively.
The patterns in Appendix Table 1 Panel A look similar if we instead aggregate across establishments up to the
firm level.
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tion:
ExportOutcomef =  Managementf +  Zf +  l +  i + "f (11)
We consider multiple dimensions of firms’ export activity as guided by theory. In di↵erent
specifications, ExportOutcomef refers to firm f ’s exporter status, log global export revenues, and
various extensive and intensive margins of exporting. We measure f ’s managerial competence
Managementf with the comprehensive z-score across all management practices surveyed.
We account for any systematic variation in supply and demand conditions across firms in the
same location l or industry i with fixed e↵ects,  l and  i. These capture di↵erences in factor
costs, factor intensities, infrastructure, institutional frictions, tax treatment, etc. that might
impact export performance. In the case of China, we add dummies for 31 provinces and 82
sectors based on the primary SIC 3-digit a liation of each manufacturer. In the case of the US,
we use indicator variables for 50 states and about 300 NAICS 6-digit industries.
We further condition on a vector of firm characteristics Zf . In all specifications, Zf includes
the full set of noise controls pertaining to the management surveys to alleviate potential measure-
ment error in Managementf . We subsume the role of firms’ ownership type with fixed e↵ects
that distinguish between private domestic companies, state-owned enterprises and foreign-owned
multinational a liates in the case of China; firm ownership data is not available for the US. We
also report results with an extended set of firm controls Zf such as firm age, capital and skill
intensity, standard productivity measures, and domestic sales. As discussed below, this helps
address concerns with omitted variable bias and reverse causality while also shedding light on
relevant mechanisms.
The coe cient of interest   reflects the sign of the conditional correlation between firms’ man-
agement competence and export performance. Given the fixed-e↵ects structure, it is identified
from the variation across companies within narrow segments of the economy. This correlation
can be interpreted in two ways through the lens of our model. If management corresponds to
firms’ exogenous productivity draw or one component of it, then   would in principle capture
the causal impact of management on export activity. Alternatively, if a primitive firm attribute
such as an exogenous productivity draw determines both the choice of management technology
and export activity,   would reflect the equilibrium relationship between a production input and
output that are joint outcomes of the firm’s maximization problem. These two alternatives are
isomorphic for our purposes and we do not seek to distinguish between them. Instead, we aim
to establish that e↵ective management is a qualitatively and quantitatively important factor in
firms’ export success (this section), and to examine its role for production e ciency and product
quality (Sections 5 and 6).10
While the US MOPS provides management data for a large cross-section of over 10,000 US
10Note that reverse causality also does not pose classical estimation bias. If higher export revenues induce firms
to adopt better management practices because of economies of scale in management use, this would be consistent
with our argument. This mechanism may be amplified if firms learn about novel managerial practices from their
experience with foreign buyers and markets (Atkin, Khandelwal, and Osman, 2017).
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firms in 2010, WMS covers only about 500 Chinese firms in 2007. In order to fully exploit
the information in the Chinese panel data, we therefore estimate specification (11) at the firm-
year level, letting all variables but Managementf vary both across firms and over time, and
controlling for changes in macroeconomic conditions with year fixed e↵ects  t. This is motivated
by the evidence in Bloom, Mahajan, McKenzie, and Roberts (2018) and patterns in our own
MOPS data that management practices evolve slowly within firms over time, such that the cross-
sectional dispersion dwarfs the time-series variation. We report standard errors clustered by firm
since our key variable Managementf is measured at the firm level.
4.2 Export Status, Revenues and Profits
We first establish that better managed firms are significantly more likely to export. Conditional
on exporting, they also earn higher export revenues. These findings provide empirical support
for Propositions 1 and 2.
Table 1 presents these baseline results. In Columns (1) and (5), we examine firms’ export
status by setting the dependent variable ExportOutcomef equal to 1 if a firm lists positive
exports on its balance sheets and 0 otherwise. We estimate equation (11) in the matched ASIE-
WMS sample for China and the matched ASM-MOPS sample for the US, respectively.11 Firms
employing more e↵ective management practices are systematically more likely to enter foreign
markets.12
We explore the relationship between managerial competence and the scale of export oper-
ations in the subset of exporting firms in Columns 3 and 7. We re-estimate specification (11)
using the log value of global exports as the outcome variable ExportOutcomef in the matched
CCTS-WMS sample for China and the matched LFTTD-MOPS sample for the US.13 We observe
that well-run exporters realize substantially higher sales abroad.14
The strong association between management competence and export activity persists when
we add an extended set of firm characteristics Zf in Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8. We control for firm
age using information on the year in which companies were established from ASIE and ASM. We
find some evidence that older manufacturers are more likely to be exporters and generate higher
export revenues, although these patterns are significant only for the US. We further condition
11For the US, we observe export status at the plant level from ASM and all other trade indicators at the firm
level from LFTTD. To exploit the full granularity of the data, we run the baseline US regressions for export status
at the plant level. Our results are robust to aggregating up to the firm level, when the coe cient magnitudes
increase by 30%-50% in the cross-section in Table 1 and more than double in the panel in Table 7.
12We report OLS results, but similar patterns hold with other estimators such as Probit or Logit.
13We measure a firm’s worldwide exports with the combined value of all its export transactions in the customs
records that cover the universe of trade transactions. This arguably gives a more accurate account of exporters’
activity than the value of total exports reported on their balance sheets. We have confirmed that the latter
produces similar results.
14Our results for China indicate that multinational companies are more likely to export and have higher export
revenues conditional on trading. However, management plays an independent role from foreign ownership that
cannot be attributed to multinational a liates being better managed. State-owned enterprises do not display
markedly di↵erent outcomes from private domestic firms.
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on firms’ production technology as reflected in their capital intensity (log net fixed assets per
worker) and skill intensity (share of workers with a college degree; log average wage). The results
corroborate prior evidence in the literature that more skill- and capital intensive firms are more
active exporters, although the point estimates are not always precisely estimated.15 To guard
against omitted variable bias, we always include this broader vector of controls Zf in the rest of
the analysis, but note that the point estimates for Managementf are typically qualitatively and
quantitatively close with and without these additional controls.
Our findings point to potentially large economic consequences from improving management
practices. Based on our estimates with the extended set of controls, a one-standard-deviation rise
in the management z-score is associated with a 5% higher probability of exporting and 23% higher
export revenues in China; these numbers are 3% and 37% for the US. Given the large management
gaps across countries shown in Figure 3, this implies that variations in management competence
could account for substantial di↵erences in trade intensity across countries. These magnitudes are
also sizeable compared to the role of firm age, skill- and capital intensity (comparable statistics
for these are in the range of 2% to 28%).
In addition to export status and revenues, Proposition 2 also has implications for firms’ export
profits. As standard with balance-sheet data, however, we observe firms’ consolidated profits
from worldwide sales that cannot be broken down by market. In Appendix Table 2, we exploit
the available information as best we can, and find indicative evidence of a positive link between
e↵ective management and export profits. We first confirm that superior managerial practices are
associated with higher firm profits, with and without the expanded set of firm controls (Columns
1-2 and 4-5). We then document that this holds even conditioning on domestic sales, calculated
as the di↵erence between total turnover and total exports (columns 3 and 6).
4.3 Extensive and Intensive Export Margins
As a first step to understanding the mechanisms through which management contributes to
export success, we decompose exporters’ trade activity into the number of foreign markets they
enter and the sales they make in each market. We find that better managed firms have the
capacity both to serve more export markets and to sell more in individual markets.
We measure the extensive margin of firms’ exports with the log number of destination coun-
tries they supply, the log number of products they ship to at least one destination, and the log
total number of destination-product markets they penetrate. We quantify the intensive margin
with average log exports per destination-product. We define products at a very granular level,
namely HS 8-digit categories. We re-estimate equation (11) using each export margin in place
of ExportOutcomef , and report our findings in Table 2. Appendix Table 3 contains symmetric
regressions without the wider set of firm controls Zf .
15The positive correlation between average wages and the share of skilled workers across Chinese firms generates
multicollinearity in Columns 2 and 4 and a negative coe cient on the skilled labor share. Both measures of skill
intensity enter positively and significantly when included one at a time.
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We consistently observe positive coe cients on Managementf across all specifications that
are statistically significant in all but one case (the intensive margin in China). For Chinese firms,
a one-standard-deviation improvement in managerial competence is associated with 19% more
export destinations, 17% more export products, 22% more destination-product markets, and 2%
higher exports in the average market (Columns 1-4 of Table 2). For American companies, these
magnitudes stand respectively at 13%, 17%, 20%, and 18% (Columns 6-9).
Overall, the extensive margin of market entry accounts for just over half of the contribution
of management to firm exports in the US. In the case of China, this share reaches 90% when we
condition on the full set of firm controls and 75% when we do not.16
These results are in line with the theoretical predictions for the margins of firms’ export
activity summarized in Proposition 2. As a final check on internal consistency, we consider the
variation in export sales across a firm’s destination-product markets. In our model, exporters
add foreign markets in decreasing order of profitability. As a result, better managed firms ser-
vicing more markets do so by entering progressively smaller markets where they earn lower sales.
This composition e↵ect implies that our intensive-margin results underestimate the relationship
between management and exports to any given market. Further analysis supports this. For
each firm, we identify its largest destination-product market by sales revenues, and regress log
exports to this top market on Managementf . We obtain much larger coe cients than those for
the intensive margin that are moreover significant for both China and the US (Columns 5 and
10). As we repeat this exercise replacing the outcome variable with log average sales to the top
two, top three, etc. export markets, we record progressively lower point estimates as anticipated.
4.4 Exports vs. Domestic Activity
We are interested in whether the positive association between management quality and export
performance reflects a general beneficial e↵ect of good management on firm activity. Through
the lens of our model, e↵ective management practices improve firm performance both at home
and abroad, such that better managed firms have higher domestic sales, higher probability of
exporting, and higher export revenues. The elasticities of these three outcomes with respect to
management di↵er and, as with productivity elasticities in workhorse trade models, generally
depend on modeling assumptions about demand.17 In our CES set-up, better management
increases firm revenues proportionately in all markets served, but it also induces entry into more
markets. As a result, total exports rise faster with management competence than domestic sales.
Appendix Table 4 corroborates these patterns in the data, further validating our model. We
compute firms’ log domestic sales by taking the di↵erence between total sales and total exports as
reported on companies’ balance sheets and matched customs records. Columns 1 and 6 confirm
16These calculations are based on comparing regression coe cients across specifications for di↵erent export
outcomes, such as Column 8 of Table 1 and Column 8 of Table 2.
17For example, the ratio of a firm’s sales in two markets is independent of firm productivity with CES but not
with linear demand or with non-homothetic preferences (Melitz, 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008).
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that producers with advanced management practices sell more at home. In the rest of Appendix
Table 4, we repeat the main regressions for manufacturers’ export status, global export revenues
and various export margins controlling for their domestic sales in addition to the extended set of
firm characteristics Zf . We continue to record positive significant coe cients on Managementf
(except for average exports per destination-product for China as before).
4.5 Interpretation: Management as Productivity
The results indicate that successful export performance is closely related to the use of sophis-
ticated management practices. Through the lens of the model, we interpret this as evidence
that managing capital and labor resources e↵ectively is critical to firm productivity. In this
sub-section, we explore this management-productivity nexus.
The theoretical notion of productivity in the literature is quantity-based total factor produc-
tivity TFPQ. In our model, this corresponds to firms’ capacity to produce a given quantity and
quality of output at lower cost. We thus view management competence as a measurable, tangible
counterpart to the theoretical concept of TFPQ, or at least an important component of TFPQ.
Standard revenue-based proxies for productivity, TFPR, are constructed from data on sales
revenues and input costs (capital, labor, materials). This approach faces two challenges. First,
TFPR is a noisy measure of TFPQ because it incorporates input and output prices and mark-
ups (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; De Loecker, 2011; Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta, 2013).
This introduces bias in regressions of firm outcomes such as export activity on TFPR. Second,
TFPR constitutes a residual from a production function and is thus a black box with no precise
economic content or actionable policy implication.
Being able to observe and quantify management practices helps overcome both of these
challenges. Management e↵ectiveness identifies specific practices that firms use in production,
such as setting targets, monitoring operations, and incentivizing workers. This unpacks the black
box of TFPR residuals to isolate well-defined economic mechanisms. Management measures also
circumvent estimation biases associated with TFPR since they are obtained independently from
data on firms’ production and trade activity.
Question 1: Where does good management come from? Observed management prac-
tices may have both an exogenous and an endogenous component. On the one hand, management
competence may be an exogenous draw at the firm level as in our baseline model. In this case,  
in specification (11) would capture the causal impact of management quality on firm performance
from, for example, exogenous variation in managers’ ability or style (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003).
On the other hand, firms may endogenously choose their managerial quality based on an
exogenous firm primitive. Estimates of   would then reflect the equilibrium relationship between
joint outcomes of the firm’s maximization problem, for example if exogenously di↵erent founder-
entrepreneurs endogenously hire managers of di↵erent skill levels.
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While we do not distinguish between these two theoretical alternatives, we establish that
management matters for firm performance and uncover the mechanisms through which it oper-
ates.
Question 2: How does management relate to TFP? Heterogeneous-firm theory tradition-
ally focuses on TFPQ productivity as the firm attribute that uniquely determines all outcomes
of the firm’s problem, including all aspects of trade activity. In practice, evidence for many
countries indicates that measured TFPR is positively but imperfectly correlated with measured
firm outcomes. There are two possible explanations for this discrepancy: TFPR and/or firm out-
comes are measured with error, or multiple firm attributes matter. For example, two di↵erent
draws may fix firms’ cost of producing respectively physical units and quality, and aggregate into
composite capability that pins down firm outcomes (Hallak and Sivadasan, 2013). We investigate
the relationship between management practices and firm productivity in Appendix Table 5. We
construct TFPRf as in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) using balance-sheet data on companies’ to-
tal sales, capital expenditures, labor costs and material purchases, and accounting for di↵erences
in production technology across industries and ownership types.
We first estimate the conditional correlation between Managementf and TFPRf by setting
TFPRf as the left-hand side variable in specification (11) (Column 1). TFPR is indeed higher
in firms employing more sophisticated management practices. We then replicate regression (11)
for TFPRf in place of Managementf (Columns 2-3). TFPR systematically enters positively
and significantly, except for Chinese firms’ export status.
Finally, we decompose TFPR into two components by regressing TFPRf on Managementf
with no other controls: the projection onto Managementf and the residual term which we call
nonManagementTFPRf . In Columns 4-5, we compare the contribution of Managementf and
nonManagementTFPRf to the variation in trade outcomes by adding both to the right-hand
side of equation (11). The estimates for Managementf are very similar to the baseline in Table
1, and imply that the management component of TFP has economically large explanatory power
in absolute and in relative terms. The rest of Appendix Table 5 documents similar patterns for
indicators of product quality and production e ciency which we introduce in Section 5.
Question 3: Which management components matter most? A policy-relevant question
is whether certain management practices are more instrumental to firm performance than others.
While the baseline management z-score we use is an average across all practices surveyed, we
can unbundle this average into sub-components in order to shed light on this policy question. To
this end, we distinguish between ”targets & monitoring” (information collection and processing)
and ”incentives” (hiring, firing, pay and promotions). The results in Appendix Table 7 indicate
that both sets of practices are significant, although perhaps with slightly stronger e↵ects on the
targets & monitoring practices.
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5 Management Mechanisms: E ciency and Quality
5.1 Structural Estimates
Having established that advanced managerial practices are associated with superior export per-
formance, we next assess the empirical validity of Propositions 3 and 4 to inform the underlying
mechanisms through which management operates. In particular, we are interested in whether
e↵ective management improves firms’ production e ciency, capacity to manufacture high-quality
products, or both. The results we establish lead us to conclude that management acts through
both these e ciency and quality channels.
We first consider the predictions of Proposition 3 for the relationship between firms’ manage-
ment practices, product quality, and quality-adjusted prices. We exploit the rich dimensionality
of the data and examine firms’ behavior in finely disaggregated export markets. This allows us
to study the role of management while accounting for various supply and demand conditions
with an extensive set of fixed e↵ects in the following estimating equations:
ln(Qualityfdp) =  
qManagementf +  
qZf +  
q
l +  
q
dp + "
q
fdp (12)
ln(Pricefdp/Qualityfdp) =  
p/qManagementf +  
p/qZf +  
p/q
l +  
p/q
dp + "
p/q
fdp (13)
Through the lens of our model, the coe cient on management in the quality equation ( q)
identifies the structural parameter ✓, which governs the e↵ect of management on product quality.
Similarly, the coe cient on management in the quality-adjusted price equation ( p/q) identifies
the structural parameter  , which captures the e↵ect of management on productive e ciency.
Specifications (12) and (13) reveal whether management operates through both the quality and
the e ciency mechanisms: According to Proposition 3, we should observe  q > 0 and  p/q <
0 if and only if the quality and e ciency channels are active, respectively. Moreover, this
interpretation is conservative given the potential for variable mark-ups.18
The unit of observation is now the firm–destination–HS8 product(-year).19 Pricefdp is the
export unit value that firm f charges for product p in destination country d (in year t). We use
free-on-board export prices that exclude trade duties, transportation costs and retailers’ mark-
up, such that Pricefdp corresponds to the sum of the exporter’s marginal cost and mark-up. We
construct model-consistent proxies for firms’ export product quality and quality-adjusted price
using data on export prices and quantities by firm, product, destination (and year). As discussed
in Section 2.1, ln qji _   ln pfobji + lnxji, such that log quality ln qji can be inferred as the sum of
log quantity xji and log free-on-board price p
fob
ji , adjusted for the elasticity of substitution across
18If better managed firms set higher mark-ups, our conclusions for  q would be una↵ected, but pfobji /qji would
be inflated and we would be less likely to find  p/q < 0.
19All results for China hold when we distinguigh between processing and ordinary exports. We find similar
patterns when we consider the firm–destination–product-trade regime–year quintuplet as the unit of observation
and include a complete set of destination–product–trade regime triple fixed e↵ects.
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varieties  . We set   = 5 (the median value in calibration exercises in the prior literature), but
our results are robust to alternative assumptions about this elasticity (Khandelwal, Schott, and
Wei, 2013).
We continue to include fixed e↵ects for firms’ provincial or state location  l and the full
set of firm controls Zf , as well as year fixed e↵ects for China. Instead of the fixed e↵ects for
firms’ primary industry  i in equation (11), we now condition on destination-product pair fixed
e↵ects  dp. These subsume the variation in total expenditure, consumer price indices and trade
costs across countries and products in the model, as well as any observable and unobservable
di↵erences in consumer preferences, institutional frictions and other forces outside the model.
Specifications (12) and (13) are thus a very stringent test of our theory, as the coe cient on
Managementf is identified from the variation across firms within very narrow segments of the
global economy, such as Chinese exporters of men’s leather shoes to Germany or US exporters
of cellular phones to Japan. We conservatively cluster standard errors by firm to accommodate
correlated shocks across destinations and products within firms.
Equations (12) and (13) are in the spirit of prior studies of the relationship between measured
firm productivity (TFPR), prices and revenues (Kugler and Verhoogen, 2009; Manova and Zhang,
2012). Since these variables are all constructed from the same raw data on sales and quantities, a
common challenge in this literature has been ruling out estimation biases arising from correlated
non-classical measurement error in the right- and left-hand side variables. We circumvent this
problem by using direct measures of management practices that are entirely independent of the
sales and quantity data.
The evidence in Table 3 lends strong support to managerial competence improving both pro-
duction e ciency and product quality. In both China and the US, we observe that management
is associated with significantly higher export quality (Columns 1 and 5) and significantly lower
quality-adjusted prices (Columns 2 and 6). Formally, we find that ✓CH = 0.531,  CH = 0.385,
✓US = 0.048 and  US = 0.045. Based on these estimates, upgrading management practices by
one standard deviation is associated with a 53% increase in product quality and a 39% decline
in quality-adjusted prices in China. In the case of the US, quality and quality-adjusted prices
are equally elastic with respect to management competence: a one-standard-deviation rise in the
management score is accompanied with roughly a 5% change in both.
Comparing the magnitude of the management e↵ects across countries should be done with
caution, because of the di↵erent survey methodologies and sample sizes. However, the relative
e↵ect of management on quality and e ciency within each country is arguably informative. We
draw two conclusions from our results.
First, management appears to have a larger impact on both productive e ciency and product
quality in China than in the US,  CH >  US and ✓CH > ✓US . One possible explanation is dimin-
ishing returns to management, since management practices are on average substantially worse
in China: Initial improvements in management yield large gains, but additional improvements
address more and more marginal issues with progressively smaller incremental benefit to quality
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and e ciency.
Second, the parameters suggest that management has a relatively bigger e↵ect on product
quality than on productive e ciency in China compared to the US, ✓CH  CH > ✓US  US = 0.
We explore this further by directly estimating the following price equation in Columns 3 and 7:
ln(Pricefdp) =  
pManagementf +  
pZf +  
p
l +  
p
dp + "
p
fdp (14)
Our theory implies that  p =  q    p/q = ✓     reflects the relative impact of management
on quality vs. e ciency. Consistently with the findings from specifications (12) and (13), the
relationship between prices and management is significantly positive in China and insignificantly
di↵erent from 0 in the US. The greater impact of management on quality relative to e ciency in
China is intuitive. When quality levels are relatively low (as they are in China compared to the
US), a marginal change in managerial competence is likely to have much larger impacts on prod-
uct quality. This is consistent with the hypothesis of Sutton (2007) that moving up the product
quality ladder through improved management practices is critical for emerging economies.
For completeness, Columns 4 and 8 document the elasticity of export quantity with respect
to management. In the model, this elasticity is      ✓ and its sign theoretically ambiguous. In
practice, quantity is invariant with management e↵ectiveness in China and increasing in the US.
5.2 Robustness
In this subsection, we perform several robustness checks and extensions to alleviate concerns
with alternative interpretations of the results for export prices and product quality.
5.2.1 Demand Elasticity
In order to infer a model-consistent proxy for product quality ln qji _   ln pfobji + lnxji, we
need the price elasticity of demand  , which with CES preferences corresponds to the elasticity
of substitution across varieties in consumption. While our baseline analysis takes a standard
parameter value from the literature,   = 5, our findings are robust to alternative assumptions.
We have confirmed that qualitatively similar patterns obtain when we instead set   equal to 4, 7,
or 10. The results also remain unchanged when we allow   to vary across SIC 3-digit industries
using estimates from Broda and Weinstein (2006) (Panel A of Appendix Table 6).
5.2.2 Variable Mark-ups
Management practices may a↵ect not only production e ciency and product quality, but also
firms’ mark-ups and thereby prices. This channel is moot in our model because CES preferences
generate constant mark-ups, but it may be important in practice. Consider a world with no
quality di↵erentiation across firms. The prior theoretical literature has shown that in certain
environments with variable mark-ups, more productive firms charge lower prices even though they
set higher mark-ups (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; Eaton and Kortum, 2002). With alternative
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market structures or strategic behavior, however, mark-ups could in principle rise su ciently
quickly with firm productivity to dominate the associated decline in marginal costs and result
in higher prices.
In the presence of quality di↵erentiation across firms, variable mark-ups might therefore
confound the inference of product quality from price and quantity data. In the former case, they
might lead us to underestimate the impact of good management on production e ciency, while
overestimating its e↵ect on product quality. In the latter case, our findings for inferred quality
and quality-adjusted prices might be driven by better managed firms extracting higher mark-ups
rather than o↵ering more sophisticated products that they assemble more e ciently.
As a step towards addressing this concern, we establish that similar results hold when we
control for firms’ market share as a proxy for their ability to impose higher mark-ups (Panel
B of Appendix Table 6). We use a Chinese (US) firm’s share of total Chinese (US) exports to
a given destination-product,
ExportsfdpP
f Exportsfdp
, as an indicator of its market power in that market.
The results for management remain robust.
5.3 Input Characteristics
We next test the predictions of Proposition 4 for the quality of firms’ intermediate inputs and
the complexity of their assembly technology. Since we do not directly observe input quality and
assembly complexity in the data, we proxy them with a variety of observed input characteristics.
We construct these using balance-sheet data on firms’ total material purchases and customs
records on the universe of firms’ imported input purchases by product and country of origin; as
common with production data, we cannot access information on firms’s domestic inputs.
We estimate specifications of the following two types:
InputCharacteristicf =  Managementf +  Zf +  l +  i + "f (15)
InputCharacteristicfop =  Managementf +  Zf +  l +  op + "fop (16)
As in equation (11), the unit of observation in regression (15) is the firm, and we include the same
set of controls (location and industry fixed e↵ects; full set of noise and firm controls). Similar
to equation (12), the unit of observation in regression (16) is the firm-country of origin-product,
and we include the same set of controls (location fixed e↵ects; country of origin-product pair
fixed e↵ects; full set of noise and firm controls). In the case of China, we again exploit the panel
and add year fixed e↵ects. We cluster error terms by firm as before.
5.3.1 Input Quality
The quality production technology in the model stipulates that making goods of higher quality
is associated with higher marginal costs. One possibility is that this reflects the need for high-
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quality intermediate inputs.20 Table 4 provides evidence consistent with better managed firms
sourcing more expensive, higher-quality inputs from richer countries of origin (✓ > 0).21 In
Columns 1-2 and 6-7, we estimate regression (15) for the log value of imports and the log share
of imports in total input purchases. For both China and the US, we find that better managed
firms have higher imports, consistent with their operating on a bigger scale and using more inputs
in absolute terms. Unlike American producers, however, better managed Chinese producers also
import a systematically higher share of their inputs, in line with priors about the paucity of
specialized, high-quality domestic inputs in China. The insignificant estimates for the US thus
serve as a corroborating placebo test.
Columns 3 and 8 confirm that well-run companies in both China and the US buy inputs from
suppliers located in richer, more developed economies. Such economies are believed to produce
higher-quality, more sophisticated goods because they employ advanced technologies and more
skilled workers (Schott, 2004). In these specifications, the outcome variable is the weighted
average log GDP per capita across a firm’s foreign suppliers, using imports by origin country
as weights. A one-standard-deviation rise in management competence is associated with 4%-5%
higher average source-country income.
In Columns 4 and 9 of Table 4, we estimate regression (16) for the log unit value of firm
imports by product and country of origin. Advanced management practices are accompanied by
higher imported input prices in China, but not significantly so in the US. In Columns 5 and 10,
we apply the structural transformation to import unit values to obtain inferred input quality,
in the same manner as we did with inferred export quality. We find that better managed firms
in both countries use higher-quality imported inputs, with a significantly higher elasticity for
China than for the US. Improving management e↵ectiveness by one standard deviation corre-
sponds respectively to 10% and 58% higher imported input price and quality among Chinese
manufacturers, but only 0% and 5% among their US counterparts. These results suggest that
at lower levels of management competence and product quality - such as the Chinese context
- good management can help firms to not only more e↵ectively source and process inputs from
advanced countries, but also to better identify high-quality suppliers within each origin country.
This additional channel might contribute towards the significantly higher elasticity of output
quality with respect to management that we documented above for China relative to the US.
5.3.2 Assembly Complexity
A body of work has proposed that manufacturing more sophisticated products entails the assem-
bly of a wider range of specialized inputs, possibly through the completion of more manufacturing
20Recall the dress example: A garment producer can choose what materials to use in order to make a dress
according to preset designs and assembly steps. He could use cheap cotton and plastic buttons to make a cheap,
low-quality dress or expensive silk and mother-of-pearl buttons to make an expensive, high-quality dress.
21As we show in Appendix 2.3, one justification for the quality production function in our model is comple-
mentarity between input quality and management competence in the production of output quality. We find some
evidence consistent with this mechanism in unreported results for the US.
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stages (Hummels, Ishii, and Yi, 2001; Yi, 2003; Johnson and Noguera, 2012). This provides a
second possible rationalization for the quality production function in the model. We therefore
use the variety of a firms’ imported inputs as a proxy for the complexity of their assembly tech-
nology. We also account for product di↵erentiation across countries supplying the same product
(Krugman, 1980). In particular, we measure input variety with the log number of di↵erent HS-8
products, countries of origin, or origin country-product pairs in a firm’s import portfolio, and
estimate specification (15) for each of these measures. As Table 5 demonstrates, better man-
aged companies systematically source more distinct inputs from more suppliers, in terms of more
origin-product combinations. These results obtain conditioning on firms’ log number of export
products. This ensures that the range of imported inputs does not rise with management com-
petence simply because of a commensurate increase in the number of output products, rather
than the use of more complex assembly.
In light of Proposition 4, the patterns in Tables 4 and 5 corroborate the idea that e↵ective
management enables firms to produce higher-quality products using higher-quality inputs and
more complex production processes. Intuitively, this could be attributed to good management
improving quality control and reducing the incidence of costly mistakes in manufacturing, which
is especially relevant when using expensive, high-quality inputs. Superior management may
also enhance the processing of specialized inputs that need to be mutually compatible for final
assembly, the coordination of multiple production stages, and the implementation of e cient
inventory practices. These practices are particularly important when the manufacturing process
is more complex.
6 Causal E↵ect of Management
The model in Section 2 has a range of empirical implications for the co-variation we expect to
see between firms’ management practices and multiple aspects of their trade activity. These are
broadly supported by the data. Although we can extend the model to capture endogenous choice
of management practice (see Appendix 2.1), we cannot empirically test this alternative model as
its predictions are observationally equivalent to those of the baseline framework with exogenous
management draws.
In this section, we provide two pieces of independent evidence which suggest that management
competence indeed exerts a causal e↵ect on firms’ production e ciency and quality capacity, and
thereby on their export performance: one based on a management intervention in a randomized
control trial in India, and one based on the panel dimension of our data for the US.
6.1 RCT Evidence
A growing body of work using randomized control trials (RCT) indicates that some aspects of
management have a causal e↵ect on firm TFP, production e ciency and product quality (e.g.
see the survey in McKenzie and Woodru↵ (2013)). Perhaps the best evidence comes from Bloom,
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Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie, and Roberts (2013), who worked with the company Accenture to
provide free management consulting services to large firms (average of 273 employees) in the
textile industry in Mumbai, India. The study examined three groups of plants over the 2008-
2011 period. 11 plants owned by 6 firms served as a pure control group, while 20 plants owned
by 11 firms constituted the treatment group. In the treated group, 14 plants were randomly
selected to receive the management intervention. They had one month of diagnostic assessment
of management practices in place and four months of consulting on 38 core management practices
across 6 key areas (factory operations, quality control, inventory control, loom planning, human
resources, and sales and orders). The remaining 6 plants in the treated firms were given only
the one-month diagnostic without any intervention. All three groups of plants were followed
for a further 3 years with monthly visits to collect detailed production data. In 2017, Bloom,
Mahajan, McKenzie, and Roberts (2018) went back to these firms to assess the long-term impact
of the intervention 8 years on. They collected various follow-up performance metrics for 2014
and 2017, including trade activity that we are the first to analyze here.
Three lessons emerge from the India RCT. First, the consulting intervention had a large
long-lasting e↵ect on the management practices that firms actually adopted. The management
practice adoption rate in the treatment plants rose from 25.6% to 63.4% in the first year, with
this slipping back somewhat over the next eight years back to 46%, but still significantly above
its initial level (or the control firms).
Second, the management intervention led to a large causal improvement in firms’ TFP and
product quality. Figure 4 plots the change in TFP during the experiment against the change in
management competence for both treatment and control plants, displaying a highly significant
positive relationship. Figure 5 similarly plots the change in the product defect rate (an inverse
measure of quality) against the change in the management score, and shows a strongly signifi-
cant downward slope. As Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie, and Roberts (2013) discuss, the
intervention led to a 37.8% improvement in management e↵ectiveness. This caused a 43% drop
in product defects, and was itself one of the major drivers of the 17% increase in TFP.
Third, the management intervention significantly increased firms’ export participation. In
the 2017 long-run follow-up, we asked firms about their export activity over the prior 10 years.
In Panel A of Table 6, we explore the intention-to-treat e↵ect of the management consulting in a
reduced-form regression of various export outcomes on a plant-level treatment dummy. We see in
Column 1 that treatment plants were 0.189 more likely to export in the post-treatment period,
suggesting that better management practices increase the extensive margin of exporting. In
Columns 2 and 3, we examine export levels respectively with the log of (1+exports) or (exports),
and find highly significant positive e↵ects for both. The results for the pure intensive margin in
Column 3 imply a 51.6% increase in export revenues from the management intervention. We
document similarly strong positive impacts in Panel B, where we use the treatment indicator as
an instrument for the management score in a two-stage IV specification.
These three pieces of causal RCT evidence highlight how adopting superior management
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strategies can lead to improvements in firms’ product quality, production e ciency, and ulti-
mately export performance in environments with weak management practices such as India.
6.2 Panel Evidence
We shed further light on the possible causal e↵ect of firm management on trade activity by
exploiting the panel dimension in our data for the US. In Panel A of Table 7, we replicate all of
our key results when regressing firms’ export and import outcomes in year 2011 on their lagged
management score (from year 2010). Conditioning as before on the full set of state fixed e↵ects,
industry fixed e↵ects, noise and firm controls, we establish broadly similar results.
Using even more stringent estimation, we show that within-firm upgrading of management
practices is associated with significant improvements in export performance, production e ciency
and output quality, and imported input quality and complexity. In particular, in Panel B of Table
7 we regress the change in all relevant trade outcomes within firms from 2005 to 2010 on the
concurrent change in their management practices.22 We include state and industry fixed e↵ects,
which now absorb not only level di↵erences, but also systematic di↵erences in time trends across
space and manufacturing sectors. Controlling for the full set of firm and noise controls as above,
we record significant coe cients across the board. Their magnitudes are occasionally slightly
reduced, consistent with management exerting greater e↵ects on the level of firm performance
than on its growth trajectory. The only point estimate that changes sign in these first-di↵erence
regressions is that for the average GDP per capita of firms’ source countries. We believe this
may be related to the rise of China over the 2005-2010 period - a country with relatively low
income but nevertheless steadily increasing product quality over time.
7 Conclusion
This paper examines for the first time the role of management practices for firms’ export per-
formance. We theoretically and empirically establish that management ability can a↵ect both
productive e ciency and quality capacity. Good managerial practices thereby enhance export
participation, intensity and number of markets served. These results suggest that e↵ective man-
agement is an important aspect of firm productivity which has typically been treated as a black
box in the prior literature. We show that although better management is associated with greater
e ciency and quality capacity in both China and the US, it matters relatively more in China,
and especially so for the quality channel. This is consistent with the idea that enhanced man-
agerial capabilities are critical for helping emerging economies move up the quality ladder and
become richer (Sutton, 2007).
22In 2010, US firms completing MOPS were asked about their management practices in both 2005 and 2010. In
2015, they likewise reported on their management practices in 2015 and 2010. The contemporaneous and recall
data for 2010 line up well (Bloom, Brynjolfsson, Foster, Jarmin, Patnaik, Saporta-Eksten, and Van Reenen, 2017),
which gives us confidence in using recall data.
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Our findings have broader implications for the microeconomics of firm operations and inform
active literatures on the nature, origin and welfare consequences of firm heterogeneity. They
also speak to policy concerns about the impact of limited management know-how on growth and
entrepreneurship in developing economies. A limitation of the work is that we have not examined
the reasons for weaker managerial ability in some firms and countries compared to others. We
believe that strengthening managerial capabilities is an important policy issue, and researchers
are starting to make in-roads into the key question of what determines management and how
policy-makers can influence it.
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Dep Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Management 0.040** 0.048*** 0.260** 0.231* 0.042*** 0.031*** 0.488*** 0.373***
(2.30) (2.75) (2.14) (1.81) (13.92) (10.13) (21.72) (16.79)
Capital Intensity -0.010 0.145 -0.020*** 0.193***
(-0.76) (1.43) (-6.04) (7.35)
Wage 0.041* 0.401** 0.106*** 0.904***
(1.82) (2.17) (9.82) (11.84)
Age 0.030 0.153 0.044*** 0.411***
(1.53) (1.01) (11.47) (13.29)
Fixed Effects
Noise Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.41 0.43 0.40 0.43 0.26 0.27 0.33 0.37
# observations 3,233 3,123 2,236 1,935 32,000 32,000 13,000 13,000
This table examines the relationship between firms' management practices, probability of exporting, and global
export revenues. In Columns 1-2 and 5-6, the sample includes all Chinese firms and US establishments in the
matched sample with balance sheet and management data, and the dependent variable is a binary indicator equal
to 1 for exporters. In Columns 3-4 and 7-8, the sample includes all exporters in the matched sample with trade and
management data, and the dependent variable is log total exports. Management Score is the standardized
average score across all questions about firms' management practices. Capital Intensity is log net fixed asset per
worker. Wage is log labor cost per employee. Age is log firm age in years. All columns control for the share of
workers with a college degree; noise controls (interview duration and time of day; interviewer dummies;
interviewee gender, reliability and competence as perceived by the interviewer). All regressions for China include
fixed effects for firm province, main SIC-3 industry, year, and ownership status (private domestic, state-owned,
foreign-owned). All regressions for the US include fixed effects for firm state and main NAICS-6 industry. Standard
errors clustered by firm (China) and robust (US). US sample sizes rounded for disclosure reasons. T-statistics in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Table 1. Export Status and Export Revenues
US
Exporter Dummy Log ExportsExporter Dummy Log Exports
China
Province, SIC-3 Industry, Own, Year State, NAICS-6 Industry
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0.185***
0.166***
0.215***
0.017
0.196*
0.134***
0.165***
0.195***
0.177***
0.320***
(2.80)
(3.33) 
(2.89) 
(0.20)
(1.74)
(13.08)
(15.32)
(15.13)
(12.75)
(16.05)
Fixed E
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Y
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Y
Y
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Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
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0.44
0.42
0.40
0.45
0.43
0.37
0.33
0.37
0.32
0.36
# observations
1,935
1,935
1,935
1,935
1,935
13,000
13,000
13,000
13,000
13,000
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Dep Variable: Log ExportQuality
Log Qual-Adj
Export Price
Log Export 
Price
Log Export 
Quantity
Log Export 
Quality
Log Qual-Adj
Export Price
Log Export 
Price
Log Export 
Quantity
Structural 
Parameter: θ
CH - δCH θCH - δCH θUS - δUS θUS - δUS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Management 0.531* -0.385* 0.146** -0.200 0.048*** -0.045*** 0.003 0.034***
(1.95) (-1.82) (2.16) (-1.49) (2.60) (-2.91) (0.68) (2.83)
Fixed Effects
Noise Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.92 0.89 0.92 0.79 0.96 0.95 0.97 0.83
# observations 58,101 58,101 58,101 58,101 290,000 290,000 290,000 290,000
This table examines the relationship between firms' management practices and the price, quality, quality-adjusted price 
and quantity of their exports. The dependent variable is log export product quality in Columns 1 and 5, quality-adjusted
log export unit value in Columns 2 and 6, log export unit value in Columns 3 and 7, and log export quantity in Columns
4 and 8, by firm-destination-product. Quality is estimated as demand elasticity (set to 5) x unit value + quantity as
descrbed in the text. Structural Parameter is the model parameter identified from the reduced form coefficient on
Management . A product is HS 8-digit. All regressions for China include fixed effects for firm province, destination-
product pair, year, and ownership status. All regressions for the US include fixed effects for firm state and destination-
product pair. All columns also include a full set of firm and noise controls as described in Table 1. Standard errors
clustered by firm. US sample sizes rounded for disclosure reasons. T-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Table 3. Production Efficiency and Product Quality
China US
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C
hina
U
S
ImportsInputs
ImportsInputs
Dep Variable: Log # Origins
Log # 
Import Prod
Log #
Origin-Prod
Log # 
Origins
Log # 
Import Prod
Log #
Origin-Prod
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Management 0.168*** 0.123* 0.145** 0.058*** 0.079*** 0.087***
(4.24) (1.82) (2.09) (7.41) (6.81) (6.97)
Log # Export 0.245*** 0.387*** 0.441*** 0.426*** 0.561*** 0.632***
Products (7.69) (6.97) (7.77) (66.14) (58.70) (60.40)
Fixed Effects
Noise Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.61 0.64 0.67 0.56 0.51 0.53
# observations 1,566 1,566 1,566 10,000 10,000 10,000
Table 5. Assembly Complexity
This table examines the relationship between firms' management practices and imported input
complexity. The dependent variable is firms' log number of origin countries in Columns 1 and 4,
log number of imported products in Columns 2 and 5, and log number of origin country-product
pairs in Columns 3 and 6. A product is HS 8-digit. All regressions for China include fixed effects
for firm province, main SIC-3 industry, year, and ownership status. All regressions for the US
include fixed effects for firm state and main NAICS-6 industry. All columns also include a full set
of firm and noise controls as described in Table 1. Standard errors clustered by firm (China) and
robust (US). US sample sizes rounded for disclosure reasons. T-statistics in parentheses. ***, **,
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
China US
Province, SIC-3 Industry, Own, Year State, NAICS-6 Industry
Dep Variable: Exporter Dummy Log (1+ Exports) Log Exports
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Intention to Treat (Reduced Form)
Treatment 0.189* 0.665** 0.416**
(1.78) (2.85) (2.80)
Panel B. Management Impact (IV 2nd Stage)
Management 0.899 3.16** 1.95**
(1.67) (2.45) (2.71)
1st Stage (Management on Treatment) F-test 35.8 35.8 20.9
Data frequency Yearly Yearly Yearly
Years 2008,11,14,17 2008,11,14,17 2008,11,14,17
Firms 17 17 12
Plants 31 31 22
# Observations 109 109 66
Table 6. India RCT: Change in Management
 and Trade Activity (2008-2017)
This table examines the relationship between firms' management practices and trade activity
following a randomized control trial that provided management consulting to plants in the textile
industry in India, 2008-2017. Results are at the plant-year level from the long-run follow-up in
Bloom et al. (2017) collecting yearly data. The pre-treatment period is 2008, and the post-
treatment period is 2011, 2014, and 2017. The sample includes 14 intervention plants in
treated firms that received both initial diagnostics and management consulting, 6 non-
intervention plants in treated firms that received only initial diagnostics, and 11 control plants
that received neither. T-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level using the sample-size appropriate t-distribution tables.
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Example 1: Monitoring
Example 2: Targets
Example 3: Incentives
Figure 1A. US Management and Organizational Practices Survey: Examples
This figure provides examples of the 16 questions in the MOPS survey for the US that span the management of physical capital
resources (subdivided into monitoring production and setting targets) and of human capital resources (incentives design).
Example 1: Monitoring: How is performance tracked?
Example 2: Targets: How are targets set?
Example 3: Incentives: How does promotion work?
Figure 1B. China World Management Survey: Examples
This figure provides examples of the 18 questions in the WMS survey for China that span the management of
physical capital resources (subdivided into monitoring production and setting targets) and of human capital
resources (incentives design).
Figure 2A. US MOPS
Figure 2B. China WMS
Figure 2. Management Practices across Firms
This figure plots the MOPS management score distribution for the US (top) and the WMS ma
score distribution for China (bottom). The management scores are averaged across all questio
being normalized for the regression analysis.
This figure plots the WMS average management score across all firms in a country, averaged over all WMS waves from 2004 
to 2014. Each firm is scored on 18 questions and each question is marked on a scale of 1 to 5, such that the overall firm and 
country scores have a range of 1 to 5.
Figure 3. Average WMS Management Practices across Countries
Figure 4. India RCT: Change in TFP vs. Change in Management (2008-2011)
This figure displays the relationship between the improvement in firms' management practices and total factor productivity (in logs)
following a randomized control trial that provided management consulting to plants in the textile industry in India, 2008-2011. It plots
the firm-by-week change in log total factor productivity against the firm-by-week change in the management score, both relative to
their pre-experiment average. See Bloom et al. (2013) for experiment details.
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This figure displays the relationship between the improvement in firms' management practices and quality control in production
following a randomized control trial that provided management consulting to plants in the textile industry in India, 2008-2011. It plots
the firm-by-week change in the log quality defects index against the firm-by-week change in the management score, both relative to
their pre-experiment average. The quality defects index measures the severity-weighted number of defects per roll of fabric. See 
Bloom et al. (2013) for experiment details.
Figure 5. India RCT: Change in Quality Defects vs. Change in Management (2008-2011)
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Panel A. Characteristics of exporters and non-exporters
Exporters Non-exporters Exporters Non-exporters
# Observations 1,875 1,358 14,000 18,000
Management 0.06 -0.09 0.12 -0.26
Log Gross Output 11.72 11.55 10.6 9.55
Log Employment 6.46 6.15 4.76 3.96
TFPR 4.86 4.77 4.3 4.07
Log Value Added / L 3.73 3.95 5.04 4.78
Panel B. Firms' management, export and import activity
Mean St Dev Mean St Dev
Management 0 1 0 1
# Export Observations 2,236 13,000
Log Exports 14.80 2.31 13.79 2.77
# Export Products 8.65 11.58 18.94 47.50
# Export Destinations 12.85 14.99 12.95 16.72
# Import Observations 2,048 10,000
Log Imports 13.87 2.97 13.93 2.96
# Import Products 33.45 51.43 19.67 43.09
# Import Origins 6.30 5.67 6.20 8.02
Appendix Table 1. Summary Statistics
This tables provides summary statistics. China: all firms in the matched WMS-
ASIE sample for 1999-2007 (Panel A) and all exporters in the matched WMS-
CCTS sample for 2000-2008 (Panel B). US: all plants in the matched MOPS-ASM
sample for 2010 (Panel A) and all exporting firms in the matched MOPS-LFTTD
sample for 2010 (Panel B).
China US
China US
Dep Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Management 0.546*** 0.387*** 0.361*** 0.431*** 0.340*** 0.111***
(6.98) (5.70) (5.43) (32.61) (27.01) (10.21)
Log Dom Sales 0.097*** 0.671***
(5.85) (64.28)
Fixed Effects
Noise Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm Controls N Y Y N Y Y
R-squared 0.45 0.55 0.57 0.71 0.75 0.85
# observations 2,520 2,438 2,438 13,000 13,000 13,000
Log Profits Log Profits
Appendix Table 2. (Export) Profits
This table examines the relationship between firms' management practices and profits. The
dependent variable is firms' log profits. All regressions for China include noise controls and
fixed effects for firm province, main SIC-3 industry, year, and ownership status. All
regressions for the US include noise controls and fixed effects for firm state and main NAICS-
6 industry. Columns 2-3 and 5-6 also include a full set of firm controls as described in Table 1.
Standard errors clustered by firm (China) and robust (US). US sample sizes rounded for
disclosure reasons. T-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level.
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0.475*** 
0.058***
0.250*
0.219*** 
0.032
0.344***
0.022***
0.164***
0.072***
0.092***
(2.97) 
(3.32) 
(1.96)  
(2.96) 
(0.37) 
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(7.35)
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(6.46)
Log D
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C
hina
U
S
Dep Variable: TFPR ExporterDummy
Log
Exports
Exporter
Dummy
Log
Exports
Log 
Export 
Quality
Log
Qual-Adj 
Exp Price
Log
Imp Input
Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. China
Management 0.150*** 0.053*** 0.287** 0.520* -0.363* 0.592***
(3.48) (2.93) (2.34) (1.89) (-1.69) (3.14) 
TFPR -0.006 0.274*** 
(-0.45) (3.54)
Non-Management TFPR -0.006 0.246*** 0.242** -0.192** 0.411***
(-0.49) (3.28) (2.30) (-2.32) (2.87)
Fixed Effects
Noise, Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country-Product FE -- -- -- -- -- Y Y Y
R-squared 0.49 0.42 0.44 0.43 0.46 0.90 0.89 0.78
# observations 2,800 2,802 1,880 2,800 1,880 54,565 54,565 70,270
Panel B. US
Management 0.090*** 0.026*** 0.358*** 0.041*** -0.045*** 0.049**
(10.10) (8.66) (16.37) (2.96) (-3.64) (2.50)
TFPR 0.040*** 0.307***
(11.49) (12.09)
Non-Management TFPR 0.037*** 0.273*** 0.025** -0.024** 0.035***
(10.50) (11.12) (2.30) (-2.38) (2.58)
Fixed Effects
Noise, Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country-Product FE -- -- -- -- -- Y Y Y
R-squared 0.83 0.28 0.38 0.28 0.41 0.97 0.96 0.93
# observations 32,000 32,000 13,000 32,000 13,000 290,000 290,000 140,000
Appendix Table 5. Management vs. TFPR
Province, SIC-3 Industry, Own, Year
This table examines the relationship between firms' management practices, total factor productivity, and trade
activity. All dependent variables are defined in Tables 1, 3 and 4. TFPR is revenue-based TFP measured as
in Levinsohn-Petrin. Non-Management TFPR is the residual from the regression of TFPR on management
and no other controls or fixed effects. All regressions for China include fixed effects for firm province, main
SIC-3 industry, year, and ownership status. All regressions for the US include fixed effects for firm state and
main NAICS-6 industry. Columns 6-8 include country-product pair fixed effects. All columns also include a full
set of firm and noise controls as described in Table 1. Standard errors clustered by firm, except for Columns 1-
5 for the US where they are robust. US sample sizes rounded for disclosure reasons. T-statistics in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
State, NAICS-6 Industry
Panel A. Sector-specific demand elasticity (Broda-Weinstein)
Dep Variable: Log ExportQuality
Log Qual-Adj
Export Price
Log Export 
Price
Log Export 
Quantity
Log Export 
Quality
Log Qual-Adj
Export Price
Log Export 
Price
Log Export 
Quantity
Structural 
parameter(s) θ
CH - δCH θCH - δCH θUS - δUS θUS - δUS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Management 0.332* -0.185 0.149** -0.203 0.042*** -0.046*** 0.003 0.034***
(1.96) (-1.48) (2.16) (-1.49) (2.99) (-3.68)   (0.68) (2.83)
Fixed Effects
Noise Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.90 0.89 0.92 0.79 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.83
# observations 58,101 58,101 58,101 58,101 290,000 290,000 290,000 290,000
Panel B. Controlling for market power
Dep Variable: Log ExportQuality
Log Qual-Adj
Export Price
Log Export 
Price
Log Export 
Quantity
Log Export 
Quality
Log Qual-Adj
Export Price
Log Export 
Price
Log Export 
Quantity
Structural 
parameter(s) θ
CH - δCH θCH - δCH θUS - δUS θUS - δUS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Management 0.531* -0.385* 0.146** -0.200 0.040** -0.044*** -0.004 0.058***
(1.95) (-1.82) (2.16) (-1.49) (2.36) (-2.99) (-1.01) (4.69)
Market Share 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.038* -0.040* -0.002* 0.048* 
(0.94) (-1.01) (0.28) (1.43) (1.78) (-1.78) (-1.72) (1.78)
Fixed Effects
Noise Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.90 0.89 0.92 0.79 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.84
# observations 58,101 58,101 58,101 58,101 290,000 290,000 290,000 290,000
This table examines the robustness of the relationship between firms' management practices and the price, quality,
quality-adjusted price and quantity of their exports. All variables, controls and fixed effects are as described in Table 3
with two exceptions. In Panel A, quality and quality-adjusted prices are constructed using industry-specific demand
elasticities from Broda-Weinstein (2006). In Panel B, an additional control is added for a firm's market power: its share
of total Chinese exports by destination-product-year (Columns 1-4) or of total US exports by destination-product
(Columns 5-8). Standard errors clustered by firm. US sample sizes rounded for disclosure reasons. T-statistics in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Appendix Table 6. Production Efficiency and Product Quality: Robustness
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Abstract
This appendix provides formal proofs for the baseline model in the paper and
presents three theoretical extensions for endogenous choice of management practices,
multiple components of firm ability, and endogenous choice of input and output quality.
1 Proofs for Baseline Model
1.1 Set Up
Product demand. The representative consumer in country j has CES utility
Uj =
"Z
i2⌦j
(qjixji)
↵di
#
1
↵ (1.1)
⇤We thank Rui Zhang and Xincheng Qiu of Peking University for his excellent research assistance for this
appendix.
where qji and xji are quality and quantity consumed by country j of variety i, and ⌦j is the set
of goods available to j. The elasticity of substitution across products is   = 1/ (1  ↵) > 1
with 0 < ↵ < 1. If total expenditure in country j is Rj, j’s demand for variety i is
xji = RjP
  1
j q
  1
ji p
  
ji . (1.2)
Proof. The utility maximization problem is
max
{xji}
Uj =
"Z
i2⌦j
(qjixji)
↵di
#
1
↵ s.t.
Z
i2⌦j
(pjixji) di = Rj. (1.3)
where pji is the price of variety i in country j. Define the Lagrangian function as
L =
"Z
i2⌦j
(qjixji)
↵di
#
1
↵ +   Rj  
Z
i2⌦j
(pjixji) di
!
. (1.4)
The first order condition implies:
@L
@xji
=
"Z
i2⌦j
(qjixji)
↵di
#
1 ↵
↵ (qjixji)
↵ 1qji    pji = 0, (1.5)
=) xji =
⇣
 pjiqji
⌘ 1
↵ 1
hR
i2⌦j (qjixji)
↵di
i
1
↵
qji
. (1.6)
Substituting for xji in the budget constraint and rearranging yields
  =
8><>:
hR
i2⌦j (qjixji)
↵di
i
1
↵
R
i2⌦j
⇣
pji
qji
⌘1  
di
Rj
9>=>;
1 ↵
and (1.7)
xji = RjP
  1
j q
  1
ji p
  
ji , (1.8)
where we have used   = 1/ (1  ↵) and defined Pj ⌘
R
i2⌦j
⇣
pji
qji
⌘1  
di
  1
1  
as a quality-
adjusted ideal price index.
1.2 Profit Maximization
Optimal firm behavior. Individual producers separately maximize profits for each destination-
product market by solving
max
pji,xji
⇡ji = pjixji   ⌧ jxji (' i)✓     fpj (1.9)
s.t. xji = RjP
  1
j q
  1
ji p
  
ji .
1
Product quality is exogenously determined by the quality production function as qji = qi =
(' i)
✓. A producer with management competence ' and product expertise  i will therefore
charge a constant mark-up 1↵ over marginal cost and have the following price, quantity,
quality, quality-adjusted price, revenues and profits for product i in market j:
pji (', i) =
⌧ j (' i)
✓  
↵
, xji (', i) = RjP
  1
j
✓
↵
⌧ j
◆ 
(' i)
   ✓ , (1.10)
qi (', i) = (' i)
✓ , pji (', i) /qi (', i) =
⌧ j (' i)
  
↵
, (1.11)
rji (', i) = Rj
✓
Pj↵
⌧ j
◆  1
(' i)
 (  1) , ⇡ji (', i) =
rji (', i)
 
  fpj. (1.12)
Proof. Define the Lagrangian function as
L = pjixji   ⌧ jxji (' i)✓     fpj + µ
⇣
RjP
  1
j (' i)
✓(  1) p  ji   xji
⌘
. (1.13)
The first order conditions are:
@L
@xji
= pji   ⌧ j (' i)✓     µ = 0, (1.14)
@L
@pji
= xji    µRjP   1j (' i)✓(  1) p   1ji = 0, (1.15)
@L
@µ
= RjP
  1
j (' i)
✓(  1) p  ji   xji = 0. (1.16)
Plugging the second condition into the third one, one obtains pji =  µ. Substituting
into the first condition, it follows that µ = ⌧ j (' i)
✓   /(    1). Using simple algebra and
  = 1/ (1  ↵) delivers the following expressions for the outcomes of interest:
pji (', i) =  µ =  
⌧ j (' i)
✓  
    1 =
⌧ j (' i)
✓  
↵
, (1.17)
xji (', i) = RjP
  1
j (' i)
✓(  1) p  ji = RjP
  1
j
✓
↵
⌧ j
◆ 
(' i)
   ✓ , (1.18)
pji (', i)
qi (', i)
=
⌧ j (' i)
  
↵
, (1.19)
rji (', i) = pjixji = Rj
✓
Pj↵
⌧ j
◆  1
(' i)
 (  1) , (1.20)
⇡ji (', i) = pjixji   ⌧ jxji (' i)✓     fpj = (1  ↵) rji   fpj = rji (', i)
 
  fpj.(1.21)
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1.3 Selection into Products and Markets
Product expertise cut-o↵ for production. Since profits ⇡d (', i) increase with product
expertise  i, there is a zero-profit expertise level  
⇤ (') for each management ability draw '
below which the firm will not produce i for the domestic market. This cut-o↵ is defined by
the zero-profit condition ⇡d (', 
⇤ (')) = 0 and is decreasing in ', i.e. d 
⇤(')
d' < 0.
Proof. The definition of the product expertise cut-o↵  ⇤ (') delivers a closed-form solution
for it:
⇡d (', 
⇤ (')) = 0, rd (', ⇤ (')) = Rd (Pd↵)  1 (' ⇤ (')) (  1) =  fp (1.22)
=)  ⇤ (') = 1
'

 fp
Rd (Pd↵)
  1
  1
 (  1)
. (1.23)
Therefore d 
⇤(')
d' < 0.
Product expertise cut-o↵ for exporting. Similarly, export profits ⇡ji (', i) increase
with product expertise  i, such that there is a cut-o↵ expertise level  
⇤
j (') for each man-
agement ability draw ' below which the firm will not export product i to country j. This
cut-o↵ is defined by the zero-profit condition ⇡ji
 
', ⇤j (')
 
= 0 and is decreasing in ', i.e.
d ⇤j (')
d' < 0.
Proof. The definition of the export product expertise cut-o↵  ⇤j (') delivers a closed-form
solution for it:
⇡ji
 
', ⇤j (')
 
= 0, rji
 
', ⇤j (')
 
= Rj
✓
Pj↵
⌧ j
◆  1  
' ⇤j (')
  (  1)
=  fpj (1.24)
=)  ⇤j (') =
1
'
264  fpj
Rj
⇣
Pj↵
⌧ j
⌘  1
375
1
 (  1)
. (1.25)
Therefore
d ⇤j (')
d' < 0.
Management ability cut-o↵ for exporting. The export profits in country j of a firm
with management competence ' are:
⇡j (') =
Z 1
 ⇤j (')
⇡ji (', ) z ( ) d   fhj. (1.26)
Since export profits ⇡j (') increase with management ability ', only firms with management
level above a cut-o↵ '⇤j will service destination j. This cut-o↵ is defined by the zero-profit
condition ⇡j
 
'⇤j
 
= 0.
3
Proof. According to Leibniz’s rule,
d⇡j (')
d'
=
Z 1
 ⇤j (')
@⇡ji (', )
@'
z ( ) d   ⇡ji
 
', ⇤j (')
 
z
 
 ⇤j (')
  d ⇤j (')
d'
. (1.27)
Since rji (', i) = Rj
⇣
Pj↵
⌧ j
⌘  1
(' i)
 (  1) and ⇡ji (', i) =
rji(', i)
    fpj, it follows that
@⇡ji (', )
@'
=
1
 
@rji (', )
@'
=
 (    1)
 
Rj
✓
Pj↵
⌧ j
◆  1
(' ) (  1) 1   > 0 (1.28)
because   > 0 and   > 1. We have already proved that
d ⇤j (')
d' < 0. Therefore
d⇡j(')
d' > 0,
such that export profits in country j increase with management ability and only firms above
a zero-profit management cut-o↵ will export to j.
Management ability cut-o↵ for production. Firm '’s global profits are given by
⇡ (') = ⇡d (')+
X
j
⇡j (') =
Z 1
 ⇤(')
⇡d (', ) z ( ) d +
X
j
 Z 1
 ⇤j (')
⇡ji (', ) z ( ) d   fhj
!
 fh
(1.29)
Since global profits ⇡ (') increase with management ability ', firms with management below
a minimum level '⇤ will be unable to break even and exit immediately upon learning their
attributes. This cut-o↵ is defined by the zero-profit condition ⇡ ('⇤) = 0.
Proof. According to Leibniz’s rule,
d⇡ (')
d'
=
Z 1
 ⇤(')
@⇡d (', )
@'
z ( ) d   ⇡d (', ⇤ (')) z ( ⇤ (')) d 
⇤ (')
d'
+
X
j
d⇡j (')
d'
. (1.30)
Since rd (', i) = Rd (Pd↵)
  1 (' i)
 (  1) and ⇡d (', i) =
rd(', i)
    fp, it follows that
@⇡d (', )
@'
=
1
 
@rd (', )
@'
=
 (    1)
 
Rd (Pd↵)
  1 (' ) (  1) 1   > 0 (1.31)
because   > 0 and   > 1. We have already proved that d 
⇤(')
d' < 0 and
d⇡j(')
d' > 0.
Therefore d⇡(')d' > 0, such that global profits increase with management ability and only
firms above a zero-profit management cut-o↵ will commence production.
1.4 Empirical Predictions
Proposition 1. Better managed firms are more likely to export.
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Proof. This proposition follows from the result that total export profits ⇡X (') =
P
j ⇡j (')
increase with management ability '. On the intensive margin, we have already established
that bilateral export profits increase with management competence, @⇡j(')@' > 0. On the
extensive margin, only firms with ability '   '⇤j will sell to destination j. For destinations
j = {1, 2, ..., J}, denote
'⇤X = min {'⇤1,'⇤2, ...,'⇤J} (1.32)
Since firms with higher ' are more likely to have both '   '⇤j for any j and '   '⇤X
overall, they have a higher propensity to export to any given destination j, as well as a higher
propensity to be exporters, i.e. to export to at least one destination. The proof to the next
proposition is closely related and provides detailed derivations for these claims.
Proposition 2. Better managed firms export more products to more destination markets
and earn higher export revenues and profits.
Proof. First, denote the number of destinations a firm enters as n (') =
P
j I
 
'   '⇤j
 
,
where
I
 
'   '⇤j
 
=
(
1, '   '⇤j
0, ' < '⇤j
(1.33)
A higher ' means that a larger number of destinations j satisfy '   '⇤j because @I(' '
⇤
j)
@' > 0.
Therefore n (') is increasing in ' and better managed exporters enter more markets, i.e.
@n(')
@' > 0.
Second, for any given market j, we have already shown that bilateral export revenues
and profits increase with management ability, drj(')d' > 0 and
d⇡j(')
d' > 0. From the product
expertise cut-o↵ condition for exporting, we know that
d ⇤j (')
d' < 0. This implies that a
higher ' is associated with a bigger measure of products Nj (') = 1   Z
 
 ⇤j (')
 
exported
to destination j:
dNj (')
d'
=  dZ
 
 ⇤j (')
 
d'
=  dZ
 
 ⇤j (')
 
d ⇤j
d ⇤j (')
d'
> 0. (1.34)
Third, total export sales rX ('), profits ⇡X (') and number of products NX (') are:
rX (') =
X
j
rj (') I
 
'   '⇤j
 
, ⇡X (') =
X
j
⇡j (') I
 
'   '⇤j
 
, NX (') = 1 Z ( ⇤X ('))
(1.35)
where  ⇤X (') = min { ⇤1 (') , ⇤2 (') , ..., ⇤J (')} denotes the minimum product expertise
cut-o↵ for exporting  ⇤j (') across countries j for a firm with given '. Note that firms export
a nested set of products i to di↵erent markets, which follows a strict pecking order based on
 i.
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Since drj(')d' > 0,
d⇡j(')
d' > 0,
@I(' '⇤j)
@' > 0 and
dNj(')
d' > 0, it directly follows that:
drX (')
d'
=
X
j
"
drj (')
d'
I
 
'   '⇤j
 
+
dI
 
'   '⇤j
 
d'
rj (')
#
> 0, (1.36)
d⇡X (')
d'
=
X
j
"
d⇡j (')
d'
I
 
'   '⇤j
 
+
dI
 
'   '⇤j
 
d'
⇡j (')
#
> 0, (1.37)
dNX (')
d'
=  dZ ( 
⇤
X ('))
d ⇤X
d ⇤X (')
d'
> 0. (1.38)
Proposition 3. Better managed firms o↵er higher-quality products if ✓ > 0, but quality is
invariant across firms if ✓ = 0. Better managed firms set lower quality-adjusted prices if
  > 0, but quality-adjusted prices are invariant across firms if   = 0. Better managed firms
charge higher prices if ✓ >   and lower prices if   > ✓, but prices are invariant across firms
if ✓ =  .
Proof. This proposition can be established directly from the solution to the firm’s profit-
maximization problem above. Taking the partial derivative of firm’s price, quality and
quality-adjusted price with respect to management ability, we have:
pji (', i) =
⌧ j (' i) ✓  
↵
=) @pji
@'
=
(✓    )
↵
⌧ j (' i)
✓   1 i (1.39)
qji (', i) = (' i)
✓ =) @qji
@'
= ✓ (' i)
✓ 1 i (1.40)
pji (', i)
qji (', i)
=
⌧ j (' i)   
↵
=) @ (pji/qji)
@'
=    
↵
⌧ j (' i)
   1 i (1.41)
Recall that ✓   0 and     0. It immediately follows that @qji@' > 0 if and only if ✓ > 0
and @(pji/qji)@' < 0 if and only if   > 0. Since the sign of
@pji
@' depends on (✓    ), @pji@' > 0 if
✓ >  , @pji@' < 0 if   > ✓, and
@pji
@' = 0 if ✓ =  .
Proposition 4. Better managed firms use more expensive inputs of higher quality and/or
more expensive assembly of higher complexity if ✓ > 0, but input quality and assembly com-
plexity are invariant across firms if ✓ = 0.
Proof. From Proposition 3, we know that better managed firms produce goods of higher
quality if and only if ✓ > 0. While we do not explicitly model firms’ endogenous choice of
product quality in the baseline framework, we assume that producing goods of higher quality
entails higher marginal production costs. The implicit micro-foundation for this quality
production function is that manufacturing higher-quality products requires more expensive
inputs of higher quality and/or more costly assembly technologies. See also Section 2.3 in
this Appendix.
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2 Model Extensions
2.1 Extension 1: Endogenous Management
Our baseline model assumes that management competence is an exogenous draw at the
firm level. We now establish that Propositions 1-4 would continue to hold if an exogenous
firm primitive endogenously determines the firm’s choice of management practice, as long
as implementing more e↵ective management practices improves firm performance but is suf-
ficiently more costly. Intuitively, adopting more sophisticated management practices can
enhance existing firm capabilities and thereby stimulate market entry and firm revenues.
Good management and intrinsic firm attributes may also be complementary, such that ef-
fective firm productivity may be supermodular in these two components. At the same time,
superior management strategies arguably require higher sunk costs of adoption (e.g. hiring a
manager, re-designing production facilities, training sta↵ to use new data monitoring, etc.)
and higher fixed costs of production (e.g. collecting data, analyzing peformance, commu-
nicating results to sta↵, etc.). As a result of such economies of scale, exogenously better
firms that expect to be more competitive in the market and generate higher sales would
endogenously choose better management practices, thereby further improving their perfor-
mance. Propositions 1-4 would then hold both for the exogenous firm primitive and for the
endogenous management quality. In particular, the Propositions would state causal e↵ects
for the firm primitive and conditional correlations for management, where the latter would
constitute one mechanism through which the former operates.
To illustrate this insight tractably and transparently, we make minimal functional form
assumptions for the impact of management choice on firm ability and for the cost of man-
agement adoption. The same insight would however apply more generally, as long as the
benefit to management upgrading increases faster with management competence than the
cost of management upgrading.
We assume that firm entrepreneurs receive an exogenous talent draw   and choose to use
management practice m at a convex fixed cost of fm, where dfm/dm > 0 and d2fm/dm2 > 0.
Firm ability ' =  m ( ) depends on the combination of talented entrepreneurs and manage-
ment e↵ectiveness. Given product expertise draws  i, firms can produce one unit of product
i with quality qi = [' i] ✓ = [ m ( ) i] ✓ at a marginal cost of [' i] ✓   = [ m ( ) i] ✓  .
In this environment, the proof below establishes that Propositions 1-4 continue to hold as
conditional correlations for the endgenous management level in two steps: We first show
that Propositions 1-4 apply for e↵ective firm ability ' =  m ( ). We then demonstrate that
e↵ective firm ability and management are monotonically related, d'/dm > 0. Together,
these two results directly imply that Propositions 1-4 must also hold for management m ( ).
Proof. Step One
This extension of the model closely follows the solution concept in Sections 1.3 and 1.4
of this Appendix. Since the fixed cost of management adoption is independent of the firm’s
product scope, market penetration, and production scale, the firms’ profit maximization
problem can be solved in steps. The choice of management practice will be determined in
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the last of these steps. All preceding steps will remain in essense the same as in the baseline
model, such that all key equations can be obtained simply by replacing ' with  m ( ).
First, note that entrepreneurial talent   and management competence m always en-
ter multiplicatively as firm ability ' =  m ( ) and fix product quality at qi = [' i] ✓ =
[ m ( ) i] ✓. The firm will therefore begin by choosing the profit-maximizing price and
quantity in each potential destination-product market, conditional on entry there. The op-
timal price, quantity, quality-adjusted price, revenues and profits for product i in country j
will be given by equations (1.17). In particular, domestic profits ⇡di ( ,m, ) from product i
and export profits ⇡ji ( ,m, i) from product i in country j will be given by the expressions
below and increasing in management competence as before:
⇡di ( ,m, i) =
1
 
Rd (Pd↵)
  1 ( m i)
 (  1)   fp =) @⇡di ( ,m, )
@m
> 0 (2.1)
⇡ji ( ,m, i) =
1
 
Rj
✓
Pj↵
⌧ j
◆  1
( m i)
 (  1)   fpj =) @⇡ji ( ,m, )
@m
> 0 (2.2)
Second, the firm will decide which products to produce and which products to export to
destination j based on product expertise cut-o↵s for production and for exporting,  ⇤ ( ,m)
and  ⇤j ( ,m). As before, these cut-o↵s are given by zero-profit conditions and defined by
equations (1.23) and (1.25). However, these are no longer closed-form solutions that depend
only on the exogenous firm attribute ' and model parameters, since firm ability ' =  m ( )
is now endogenous. Note also that these product expertise cut-o↵s are decreasing in both
entrepreneurial talent and management capacity:
 ⇤ ( ,m) =
1
 m

 fp
Rd (Pd↵)
  1
  1
 (  1)
,
@ ⇤ ( ,m)
@m
=   
⇤
m
< 0,
@ ⇤ ( ,m)
@ 
=   
⇤
 
< 0 (2.3)
 ⇤j ( ,m) =
1
 m
264  fpj
Rj
⇣
Pj↵
⌧ j
⌘  1
375
1
 (  1)
,
@ ⇤j ( ,m)
@m
=   
⇤
j
m
< 0,
@ ⇤j ( ,m)
@ 
=   
⇤
j
 
< 0 (2.4)
Third, the firm will choose which export markets j to enter. This decision will be guided
by firm ability cut-o↵s for exporting, '⇤j , which are pinned down by the zero-profit condition
⇡j
 
'⇤j
 
= 0 as earlier.
Together, the results above imply that Propositions 1-4 hold for e↵ective firm ability
' =  m ( ).
Step Two
Given Step One above, Propositions 1-4 will atutomatically hold for management com-
petence m if e↵ective firm ability ' =  m ( ) is increasing in m. We now prove this mono-
tonicity.
In the final stage of the firm’s problem, the entrepreneur will decide whether to begin
production upon learning his talent draw. It is at this point that the firm will also choose its
optimal management practice m and thereby e↵ective ability ', in order to maximize global
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profits from domestic sales and any exports abroad. This profit maximization problem closely
resembles equation (1.29) in the baseline model:
max
m
⇡ ( ,m) =
Z 1
 ⇤( ,m)
⇡di ( ,m, ) z ( ) d +
X
j
 Z 1
 ⇤j ( ,m)
⇡ji ( ,m, ) z ( ) d   fhj
!
 fh fm.
(2.5)
The first order condition with respect to management practices m implies that:
@⇡ ( ,m)
@m
=
✓Z 1
 ⇤( ,m)
@⇡di ( ,m, )
@m
z ( ) d   ⇡di ( ,m, ⇤) z ( ⇤) @ 
⇤ ( ,m)
@m
◆
+ (2.6)
+
X
j
 Z 1
 ⇤j ( ,m)
@⇡ji ( ,m, )
@m
z ( ) d   ⇡ji
 
 ,m, ⇤j
 
z
 
 ⇤j
  @ ⇤j ( ,m)
@m
!
  @fm
@m
=
=
Z 1
 ⇤( ,m)
Ad  (    1) ( m )
 (  1)
m
z ( ) d +
+
X
j
 Z 1
 ⇤j ( ,m)
Aj  (    1) ( m )
 (  1)
m
z ( ) d 
!
  @fm
m
= 0.
Note that by the definition of the zero-profit product expertise cut-o↵s  ⇤ ( ,m) and
 ⇤j ( ,m), the terms involving ⇡di ( ,m, 
⇤) = ⇡ji
 
 ,m, ⇤j
 
= 0 drop out. For ease of
notation, the exogenous terms characterizing aggregate expenditure, aggregate price indices,
and bilateral trade costs have been collected in Ad , 1 Rd (Pd↵)
  1 and Aj , 1 Rj
⇣
Pj↵
⌧ j
⌘  1
.
Using this first order condition, one can solve for the firm’s optimal management compe-
tence level m as an implicit function of   defined as F ( ,m):
F ( ,m) ⌘
Z 1
 ⇤( ,m)
Ad  (    1) ( m )
 (  1)
m
z ( ) d + (2.7)
+
X
j
 Z 1
 ⇤j ( ,m)
Aj  (    1) ( m )
 (  1)
m
z ( ) d 
!
  @fm
m
, Fd ( ,m) +
X
j
Fj ( ,m)  @fm
m
.
We want to prove that ' =  m ( ) is increasing in m. We therefore need to show that:
d ( m ( ))
dm
=
d 
dm
m+   =  
✓
d 
dm
m
 
+ 1
◆
> 0. (2.8)
From the Implicit Function Theorem, it follows that:
d 
dm
=  @F/@m
@F/@ 
. (2.9)
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Therefore, all we need is to prove that:
@F/@m
@F/@ 
<
 
m
. (2.10)
We first show that the denominator @F/@  is positive. Note that
@F
@ 
= F1d ( ,m) +
X
j
F1j ( ,m) , (2.11)
where for each country k in the set comprising the home economy d and all potential
export destinations j, k 2 {d} [ {1, 2, . . . , J}, F1k ( ,m) is given by:
F1k ( ,m) = Ak  (    1) ( m) (  1) 1
"
  (    1)
Z 1
 ⇤k( ,m)
  (  1)z ( ) d     ( ⇤k) (  1) z ( ⇤k)
@ ⇤k ( ,m)
@ 
#
.
(2.12)
Since @ ⇤k ( ,m) /@  < 0 as shown above, it follows that @F/@  > 0.
We next examine the numerator @F/@m:
@F
@m
= F2d ( ,m) +
X
j
F2j ( ,m)  d
2fm
dm2
, (2.13)
where for each country k, F2k ( ,m) is given by:
F2k ( ,m) = Ak  (    1) ( m) (  1) 1
m
"
  (    1)  1
m
Z 1
 ⇤k
  (  1)z ( ) d   ( ⇤k) (  1) z ( ⇤k)
@ ⇤k
@m
#
.
(2.14)
Since @F/@  > 0 and d2fm/dm2 > 0, we therefore know that:
@F/@m
@F/@ 
<
F2d ( ,m) +
P
j F2j ( ,m)
F1d ( ,m) +
P
j F1j ( ,m)
. (2.15)
Recalling that @ ⇤k/@  =   ⇤k/  and @ ⇤k/@m =   ⇤k/m for all k 2 {d} [ {1, 2, . . . , J},
one can show that F2k ( ,m) /F1k ( ,m) <  /m:
F2k ( ,m)
F1k ( ,m)
=
Ak  (    1) ( m) (  1) 1m
h
 (  1) 1
m
R1
 ⇤k
  (  1)z ( ) d   ( ⇤k) (  1) z ( ⇤k) @ 
⇤
k
@m
i
Ak  (    1) ( m) (  1) 1
h
  (    1) R1 ⇤k   (  1)z ( ) d     ( ⇤k) (  1) z ( ⇤k) @ ⇤k@  i
(2.16)
=
 
h
 (  1) 1
m
R1
 ⇤k
  (  1)z ( ) d + ( ⇤k)
 (  1) z ( ⇤k)
 ⇤k
m
i
h
  (    1) R1 ⇤k   (  1)z ( ) d +   ( ⇤k) (  1) z ( ⇤k)  ⇤k  i
=
 
m
·
(  (    1)  1) R1 ⇤k   (  1)z ( ) d + ( ⇤k) (  1) z ( ⇤k) ⇤k
  (    1) R1 ⇤k   (  1)z ( ) d + ( ⇤k) (  1) z ( ⇤k) ⇤k
<
 
m
.
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Therefore,
@F/@m
@F/@ 
<
F2d ( ,m) +
P
j F2j ( ,m)
F1d ( ,m) +
P
j F1j ( ,m)
<
 
m
. (2.17)
We have thus proven that e↵ective firm ability ' =  m ( ) is increasing in management
competence m. Since all comparative statics for ' hold as in the baseline model, it follows
that all propositions also hold as conditional correlations for management quality m even
when firms endogenously choose their management practices.
2.2 Extension 2: Multiple Ability Components
The theoretical predictions of our baseline model would continue to hold if management
is one of multiple draws that jointly determine firm ability '. For example, firm ability
' = m ·  may depend on the entrepreneur’s intrinsic talent   and the manager’s competence
for implementing e↵ective management practices m. If entrepreneurs and managers do not
match perfectly assortatively due to labor market frictions, then |corr(m, )| 6= 1. While all
firm outcomes would now be pinned down by ' instead of m alone, management competence
would have the same e↵ects as in our baseline model ceteris paribus. Propositions 1-4 would
now hold for ' unconditionally, for   conditional on m, and for m conditional on  . The
last result is the conditional relationship that remains relevant for our empirical analysis.
2.3 Extension 3: Endogenous Quality
For expositional simplicity, we do not model firms’s choice of product quality in the base-
line model, and adopt instead a reduced-form quality production function. Endogenizing
firms’ choice of input and output quality in a richer framework would however preserve our
theoretical predictions. What is su cient for this to occur is that output quality - and by
extension firm profits - is supermodular in firm ability and either the quality of inputs or the
complexity of the assembly process. We illustrate this point here by incorporating endoge-
nous quality choice as in Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) into our baseline framework. The
same key insights would emerge with alternative microfoundations for the quality production
function.
We assume that there is complementarity between firm ability and input quality in the
production of output quality. In particular, using an input of quality cji, the firm can produce
one unit of product i with output quality
qji =

1
2
⇣
(' i)
b
⌘⇢
+
1
2
 
c2ji
 ⇢  1⇢
(2.18)
at a marginal cost of cji. In this setting, the parameter b can be interpreted as the scope for
quality di↵erentiation, while the parameter ⇢ governs the degree of complementarity between
input quality cji and firm-specific management ' (as well as firm-product specific expertise
 i). The quadratic specification for cji is not crucial but adopted for tractability.
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Given this quality production function, more capable firms will optimally use higher-
quality inputs in order to produce higher-quality goods.
Proof. Now the firm’s maximization problem becomes
max
pji,xji,cji
⇡ (', i) = pjixji   ⌧ jxjicji   fpj
s.t. xji = RjP
  1
j q
  1
ji p
  
ji
Substituting the constraint into the objective function, this is equivalent to solving
max
pji,cji
⇡ji (', i) = RjP
  1
j

1
2
(' i)
b⇢ +
1
2
c2⇢ji
   1
⇢
p  ji (pji   ⌧ jcji)  fpj
The first order conditions with respect to pji and cji yield the following equations respec-
tively:
pji =
 
    1⌧ jcji (2.19)
(    1) c2⇢ 1ji (pji   ⌧ jcji) = ⌧ j

1
2
(' i)
b⇢ +
1
2
c2⇢ji
 
(2.20)
Substituting equation (2.19) into equation (2.20) and using equation (2.18) delivers the
following endogenous input quality cji and output quality qji as a function of firm manage-
ment ability ' and product expertise  i:
cji = ci = (' i)
b
2 , qji = qi = (' i)
b . (2.21)
This expression immediately implies that better managed firms will endogenously choose
to source higher-quality inputs in order to produce higher-quality goods, i.e. @ci(', i)@' > 0
and @qi(', i)@' > 0. While we have allowed firms to freely vary input and output quality
across markets j, the quality production function we have considered guarantees that firms
optimally select a single quality level for each product i in their portfolio. Intuitively, better
managed firms would endogenously produce higher-quality goods for any given market under
alternative formulations that allow for quality customization across markets.
Finally, note that when ✓ = b and   = b2 , the solution in equation (2.21) corresponds
exactly to the reduced-form formulation of the quality production function in our baseline
model: Firms then produce one unit of product i with quality qi = (' i)
✓ at a marginal cost
of ci = (' i)
✓  .
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